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Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era
of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the
Federal Courts
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise
In our continuing empirical study of religious-liberty decisions in the
federal courts, American Muslims were at a distinct and substantial
disadvantage in raising free exercise or accommodation claims between
1996 and 2005. With other variables held constant, the likelihood of
success for non-Muslim claimants in Religious Free Exercise claims was
38%, while the probability of success for Muslim claimants fell to 22%
(with an even higher disparity among court of appeals judges). In sum,
Muslim claimants enjoyed only about half the chance to receive
accommodation of their religious beliefs and practices as did claimants from
other religious communities.
Drawing on insights from legal studies, political science, and social and
cognitive psychology, we discuss alternative explanations for this result,
including: (1) a cultural antipathy toward Islam as another minority
religion outside the modern American religious triumvirate of Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism; (2) the growing secularism in certain sectors of
society along with opposition to groups holding traditional religious values;
(3) the possibility that claims made by Muslims are weaker and deserve to be
rejected on the merits; and (4) the fears harbored by many Americans that
followers of Islam pose a security danger to the United States, especially in
an era of terrorist anxiety. As a new threat to religious liberty, the persistent
uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its followers appears to
have filtered into the attitudes of such well-educated and independent elites
as federal judges.

 Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota) (gcsisk@stthomas.edu). For comments on an earlier draft, we thank Hadar
Aviram, Thomas Berg, Raj Bhala, Marie Failinger, Richard Garnett, Robert Kahn, Nekima LevyPounds, Michael Paulsen, Lena Salaymeh, David Schwartz, Dawinder Sidhu, Kristen Stilt,
Ahmed Taha, Robert Vischer, and the participants and attendees at panels at the Conference
on Empirical Legal Studies at Northwestern University on November 5, 2011, the Twin Cities
Law & Society Conference at the University of Minnesota on October 14, 2011, and the Law &
Society Association annual meeting in San Francisco on June 4, 2011. Responsibility for errors
and unwise failures to heed such counsel by other scholars belongs solely with the authors.
Professor Sisk thanks his assistant, Bethany Fletcher, for work inputting coding and law
students, Eric Beecher and Alicia Long, for conducting cross-checks on opinion coding.
 Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (michael.heise@cornell.edu).
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The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside
in their course, and pass the judges by.
—Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Following an Islamic legal ruling by local Muslim leaders, Somali
immigrant taxi drivers in the Twin Cities refused to transport passengers
who were openly carrying alcoholic beverages, believing that doing so would
violate the Qur’an’s ban on intoxicants.2 Many travelers arriving at the
Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport, who were toting transparent
bags containing bottles of wine or carrying boxes of liquor were turned away
by the first driver waiting in the taxi line (if he were a Muslim) and instead
directed to another taxi driver (who was not).3 Upset at being declined
service by a taxi driver, travelers lodged complaints with the airport
administration.4
Wanting to ensure that all arriving travelers would find convenient
ground transportation while also accommodating the beliefs of the Somali
Muslim taxi drivers, the Metropolitan Airports Commission came up with
what both airport officials and Somali taxi drivers thought was an “ingenious
solution.”5 Those taxi drivers who, by reason of religious stricture, could not
transport alcoholic beverages would install a light on top of their cabs so
that the dispatcher could instead signal a different taxi driver to come
forward for passengers openly carrying liquor.6 In this way, most persons
seeking a taxi at the airport would be served promptly and likely not even

1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
2. Keith Oppenheim, If You Drink, Some Cabbies Won’t Drive, CNN.COM (Jan. 26, 2007),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/25/oppenheim.cabbies/index.html; see also QUR’AN, Surah
Al-Ma’idah 5:90 (prohibiting intoxicants).
3. See David Van Biema, Religion: Minnesota’s Teetotal Taxis, TIME (Jan. 19, 2007), http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580390,00.html. These Somali immigrant taxi
drivers do not have any religious duty to inquire of passengers about alcoholic beverages or to
investigate whether closed baggage contained liquor. See Dolal v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, No.
A07-1657, 2008 WL 4133517, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008) (reporting affidavit of
Muslim religious leader that taxi drivers are prohibited from searching passenger baggage and
are only precluded from transporting a passenger when the driver knows he is carrying
alcohol). Thus, only when a potential passenger was carrying an alcoholic beverage in view of
the driver, such as in a bag that did not hide its contents or in a labeled liquor box, did the
driver then believe that to accept the passenger would be to knowingly participate in the
transportation of intoxicating substances.
4. Oppenheim, supra note 2.
5. Van Biema, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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notice that they were being picked up by one taxi driver rather than
another.
Notwithstanding this carefully crafted compromise, and without
substantial evidence that implementing this accommodation for Muslim taxi
drivers would disrupt ground transportation or significantly inconvenience
passengers, the Metropolitan Airports Commission suddenly revoked its
support for the proposal. The reason for the abrupt reversal was, in the
words of the commission spokesman, a “public backlash” in the form of
emails and telephone calls opposing the policy.7 The spokesman said that
“the feedback we got, not only locally but really from around the country
and around the world, was almost entirely negative. . . . People saw that as
condoning discrimination against people who had alcohol.”8
Newspaper editorialists had urged the public to register protests with
the commission. Some decried the accommodation policy as an “insidious”
imposition of “the Shari’a, or Islamic law, with state sanction.”9 Others raised
fears of a slippery slope that would lead to further accommodations for
Muslims, warning that “down the road could lie a legally sanctioned
religious separatism that is incompatible with America’s unifying civic
vision.”10 One comment on an online bulletin board simply told the Muslim
cabbies to “GET OVER IT, you are in America[,] act like an American!”11
In the end, a governmental body overturned an apparently wellbalanced and effectively operating accommodation for a particular sincerely
held religious belief of a minority based, not on any showing of concrete and
substantial harm, but on the vehement opposition of vocal objectors.
Indeed, after changing course, the commission took a progressively harsher
stance against the Muslim taxi drivers. Previously, the commission had
simply directed that taxi drivers who refused a fare would be required to go
to the back of the line, which could mean waiting hours for the next
potential passenger.12 Subsequently, the commission adopted a new policy
imposing a thirty-day suspension of a driver’s airport license for a first-time
refusal of a fare and a two-year revocation for a second offense,13 effectively
forcing these Muslim taxi drivers to choose between being faithful and
making a living. A Minnesota imam and Islamic law scholar remarked,
7. Oren Dorell, Cabbies, Culture Clash at Minn. Airport, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-cabbies-culture_x.htm.
8. Oppenheim, supra note 2.
9. Daniel Pipes, Don’t Bring That Booze into My Taxi, N.Y. SUN (Oct. 10, 2006), http://
www.danielpipes.org/4046/dont-bring-that-booze-into-my-taxi.
10. Katherine Kersten, A Two-Tiered Airport Taxi System Could Lead to ‘Chapter Two,’ MINN.
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.startribune.com/local/11585696.html?refer=y.
11. Amy White, Muslim Cabbies, CENTER ON RELIGION & PROFS. (May 28, 2009),
http://www.religionandprofessions.org/1328/muslim-cabbies-case-study.
12. Oppenheim, supra note 2.
13. MAC Approves New Penalty for Taxi Drivers Who Refuse Service, KARE 11 NEWS (Apr. 16,
2007), http://www.kare11.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=251338.
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“[t]his type of job helps immigrants move to the next level. Blocking that
can cost jobs [and] can also cost immigrants and their families the American
dream.”14
Having lost the political battle for religious accommodation in the wake
of the public backlash, the taxi drivers turned to the Minnesota courts,
asserting that the Commission’s strict no-exception policy infringed their
constitutional right to freely exercise their religion.15 Noting alternative nonequitable and administrative remedies, as well as the possibility of a stay of
any suspension of taxi-driving privileges, the Minnesota courts denied the
taxi drivers’ request for an injunction against enforcement of the
Commission’s new rule.16 So far, at least, a judicial venue has not been
availing.
As part of our continuing empirical study of religious-liberty decisions,17
we highlight in this Article the steep uphill climb faced by American
Muslims in asserting free exercise of religion or religious accommodation
claims in the lower federal courts between 1996 and 2005.18 We find that,
unlike members of nearly every other religious community, Muslim
claimants were at a distinct and substantial disadvantage.19 While Muslim
claimants accounted for 15.6% of free exercise claimants in our study, they
accounted for only 10.0% of successes. A regression analysis modeling the
outcomes of the free exercise and accommodation cases reveals that the
“Muslim” claimant variable was statistically significant in a negative direction,

14. Barbara Pinto, Muslim Cab Drivers Refuse To Transport Alcohol, and Dogs, ABC NEWS (Jan.
26, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2827800&page=1.
15. Dolal v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, No. A07-1657, 2008 WL 4133517, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 9, 2008). While the Twin Cities Muslim taxi-driver case illustrates the kinds of
accommodations sought by persons of faith and the political responses sometimes encountered,
it was not among those cases included in our data set for empirical analysis, both because it was
decided by Minnesota state courts under the Minnesota Constitution (whereas our data set
includes lower federal court decisions) and because it was decided in 2008 (whereas our data
set includes cases from 1996–2005).
16. Id. at *3–4; see also Muslim Cab Drivers Lose Round in Court, MPR NEWS (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/09/09/muslim_cabs_court.
17. See Michael Heise & Gregory Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Heise
& Sisk, Religion Before the Bench]; Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial
Decision Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk, How
Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases,
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?
An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201
(2012) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions]; Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
743 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology]; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious
Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part III.B.
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in contrast with the variables for all other categories of religious claimants
(with the sole exception of marginal sects of black separatists).
The magnitude of the negative effect on Muslim claimants in these
religious-liberty cases is powerful. Holding all other variables constant, the
predicted likelihood of success for non-Muslim claimants was approximately
38%, while the predicted probability for success for Muslim claimants was
approximately 22%.20 In other words, after controlling for the type of case
(such as whether the claimant was a prisoner or raised an employment
discrimination claim), the ideology of deciding judges, and other judge
demographic variables such as gender, race, and professional background,
Muslim claimants were predicted to prevail little more than half as
frequently as claimants from other religious communities.
Aside from a small number of black separatist sects, followers of other
minority religions were not similarly disadvantaged in our study. Indeed,
while the numbers were small, Buddhist and Rastafarian claims prevailed at
a higher predicted rate than those from other religious groups. Thus, the
results of our study cannot be readily explained by the conventional wisdom
that members of minority religions seldom succeed in religious-liberty
litigation.21
Nor can we confidently attribute these results to the traditionalist
nature of Islam—that is, viewing the results of this study through the lens of
the larger “culture wars” within the United States.22 We found that adherents
to other faiths that emphasize traditional moral values, such as Catholics and
Baptists, were not subject to the same disadvantage in court for this time
period, although a particular trend in the legal doctrine may account for
why these other traditionalist religious believers may no longer suffer a
similarly diminished opportunity for success.23 In any event, the types of
cases typically brought by Muslim claimants did not present direct clashes
between traditional values and secular regulations, which instead tend to
arise in cases such as those involving the application of anti-discrimination
laws to religious institutions.24
By employing control variables, separately examining prisoner and nonprisoner cases, and noting the typical nature of Muslim claims, we conclude
that the poorer results for Muslim claimants uncovered by our study cannot
be attributed to weaker religious-liberty claims on the merits.25
We believe the most likely explanation for the impaired success for
Muslims in religious-liberty claims lies in the lingering perception that Islam

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
See infra Part IV.B.2.d.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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poses a risk to our nation’s security.26 The results of this study suggest that
federal judges are not immune to the fears and suspicions often directed
toward Muslims in American public life. These negative attitudes—harbored
by those who see followers of Islam as posing a danger to American society—
appear to have infected the subconscious attitudes of such well-educated
and independent elites as federal judges.27
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION
DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1996–2005
A. THE RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION STUDY
1. The Nature of the Study
In the present 1996–2005 study, we conducted an analysis of decisions
made by judges of both the federal courts of appeals and the district courts
in cases where plaintiffs raised constitutional or statutory religious freedom
claims.28 For this Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of the
study, we created a data set of the universe of Westlaw digested decisions by
the federal district courts and courts of appeals from 1996 through 2005 in
which a religious believer or institution sought accommodation by the
government or asserted that a government action burdened the free
exercise of religion, inhibited religious expression, or discriminated on
religious grounds.29
As in our prior study,30 we defined “Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation” cases to include (1) claims arising directly under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution;31 (2) claims arising under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment involving alleged government suppression of religious
26. See infra Part IV.B.4.
27. See infra Part V.
28. For more information about our data set, primary regression analysis results, coding of
each decision, coding of each judge, and information about our coding methods, see Gregory
Sisk & Michael Heise, Empirical Study of Religious Liberty Decisions, U. ST. THOMAS,
http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2012).
29. In our prior 1986–1995 study of religious-liberty decisions, we included only
published decisions in our data set. In so doing, we knowingly “biased our database in favor of
decisions that raise highly visible, controversial, landmark, or difficult questions of religious freedom,
or at least issues of religious freedom that a judicial actor found particularly interesting and thus worthy
of publication.” Sisk, supra note 17, at 1049. For the present study, we have expanded the data set to
include the set of unpublished but digested opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 1290 judicial
participations from published decisions, our data set for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation
decisions includes 341 judicial participations from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but not
published in the reporter system.
30. For further explanation of the definition and coding of Free Exercise/Accommodation,
see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 53134; Sisk, supra note 17, at 103133.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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expression;32 (3) claims based on federal statutes designed to promote the
free exercise of religion and speech, including the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”),33 the Equal Access Act (“EAA”),34 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”);35 and (4)
charges against government entities of discrimination or inequitable
treatment of individuals or organizations based on religious conduct or
affiliation, including constitutional equal-protection claims and statutory
employment-discrimination claims against federal government employers. A
substantial majority (58.5%) of the claims presented were premised, at least
in part, directly on the Free Exercise Clause, followed by assertions of
unequal governmental treatment (30.4%). Statutory religious-liberty claims
were raised in 20.9% of the observations, and 26.7% involved religiousexpression claims.
As the decisions were collected, we coded and cataloged the direction
of each ruling,36 general factual category of the case, religious affiliation of
both the claimant and judge, the religious demographics of the judge’s
community, the judge’s ideology, the judge’s race and gender, and various
background and employment variables for the judge.37 As the point of
analysis, we examined each individual judge’s ruling in each particular case
as a “judicial participation.”38 Each district court judge’s ruling was coded
separately, as was each distinct vote of the multiple judges participating on
an appellate panel.
Our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation data set consisted of
1631 judicial participations (395 by district court judges and 1236 by court
of appeals judges). In terms of raw frequencies, before multivariate

32. Id.
33. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb2000bb-4 (2006). Although
the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state and local governments on the grounds
that Congress exceeded its congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the statute continues to apply to the federal
government. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006).
34. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 40714074 (2006).
35. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc2000cc-5
(2006).
36. For further information on how we coded a religious-liberty decision on the merits,
see Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1207–11; Sisk, Heise & Morriss,
supra note 17, at 546–48.
37. Every decision was independently coded by both a trained law student and one of the
authors. For more detailed information about our study, data collection, and coding, see the
description published as part of our prior study of religious-liberty decisions from 1986–1995,
Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 530–54, 571–612. The few changes in the selection of
variables and coding from the prior study may be found by reviewing our table and coding. See
supra note 28.
38. For a further discussion of judicial participations as the data point, see Sisk, Heise &
Morriss, supra note 17, at 539–41.
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regression analysis, the religious-liberty claim was favorably received by the
ruling judge at a rate of 35.5%.39
The dependent variable was the direction of the individual judge’s vote
in
each
case,
coded
as
“1”
when
the
Religious
Free
Exercise/Accommodation claim was accepted and as “0” when it was
rejected. Because we analyzed the influences of multiple variables, multiple
regression models were adopted. Because the dependent variable was
dichotomous, we used logistic regression.40
2. Clustering Standard Errors at the Judge and Circuit Levels
Recognizing that judicial rulings may not be fully independent from
one another by reason of precedential constraints within a circuit or because
of the repeated participation of the same judge in multiple cases, we
adjusted the standard errors by clustering on one level or another. In the
Establishment Clause phase of our study, we found no substantive
differences between clustering standard errors at the circuit level and at the
judge level. Because the chosen dimension made no substantive difference,
and believing that those Establishment Clause cases were somewhat more
likely to be responsive to circuit precedent, we reported the regression
results in that companion article with clustering at the circuit level.41
In this Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of study, 1379 of
the 1631 observations (84.6%) were made by judges who participated in
more than one decision, indicating that standard errors should be adjusted
by clustering at the individual judge level. Both Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise cases typically raise “constitutional fact” disputes,42 where the
salience or comparative weight of factual elements of the case are at the core
of the constitutional question. Such constitutional claims demand de novo
judicial evaluation similar to that used when resolving questions of law, even
on appellate review.43 While recognizing the legal nature of these
39. In our prior 1986–1995 study, Free Exercise/Accommodation claimants prevailed at a
rate of 35.6%, id. at 553, reflecting a truly astoundingly stable rate of success across two
decades, varying only by one-tenth of a percentage point.
40. See id.
41. See Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1213 & n.43.
42. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987) (explaining that “any factual
findings subsumed in [a constitutional] determination are subject to constitutional fact review”
by the appellate court and thus demand non-deferential evaluation by each judicial actor); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n cases raising First
Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make
an independent examination of the whole record’” to determine the constitutional importance
of the facts of the case (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–86 (1964))). See
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).
43. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding that, in Free Exercise Cases, “[courts] review the core constitutional facts de
novo, unlike historical facts, which are measured only for clear error” (quoting Bloedorn v.
Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Faustin v.
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dispositions, Free Exercise decisions appeared to be less affected by circuitspecific precedents. Based on our review of the opinions, the Free Exercise
cases appeared more likely to turn on each judge’s evaluation of the legal
merits of individual claims and the government’s defenses—that is, a
comparative evaluation of the burden on the claimant’s practice of religion
against the magnitude of the interests cited by the government in resisting
accommodation. Following the path of other researchers who study judicial
decision-making, we also apprehend that a larger number of clusters
enhances the accuracy of inferences.44
For these reasons, and mindful that “[c]lustering helps mitigate the
underestimation of standard errors . . . and reduces the risk of rejecting a
true null,”45 we have adopted clustering at the judge level as the first of our
primary models in the current phase of the study. We employed clustering at
the circuit level as an alternative primary model.
We report the results of both clustering approaches in the regression
table below. Results from these two primary models are similar but not
identical, as some variables meet significance levels for one clustering
approach but not the other. We note those differences in significance of
variables when relevant in the discussion below. We also used alternative
proxies for ideology, which produced nearly identical results. For
convenience, we created a table for the model using “Common Space
Scores” to measure ideology.46
3. Statistical Significance for Finding a Correlation Between an
Independent (Explanatory Variable) and the Dependent (Outcome)
Variable
Among social scientists, statistical significance is traditionally set at the
p < .05 level (or 95% probability level).47 This roughly means that the
probability (“p”) that the reported association between an independent
variable and dependent variable is a product of chance is less than (“<“) 1 in
City of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We also review the district court’s
findings of constitutional fact in a First Amendment claim and conclusions of law de novo.”).
44. In our primary model, the standard error was adjusted for 581 clusters by judge.
45. Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 837 n.168 (2009).
46. On Common Space Scores as a proxy for judicial ideology, see Sisk & Heise,
Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1222–26. On proxy variables for measuring judicial
ideology, see Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 17, at 769–94.
47. See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
154 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that researchers generally “do not regard the evidence against
[the null hypothesis] as strong unless P is very small, say, P < 0.05 or P < 0.01”); see also David A.
Gulley, The Adoption of Statistical Tests by Natural Scientists: An Empirical Analysis 19 (Columbia
Univ. Dep’t of Indus. Eng’g & Operations Research, Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012659 (finding that, for natural scientists conducting empirical
research, the statistical significant test of 95% probability or higher had become “almost
universal” during the twentieth century).
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20, or 5% (“.05”).48 We acknowledge that selection of the 95% probability
level as the benchmark for identifying those variables deserving interpretive
attention is arbitrary. We appreciate that the difference between, say, p < .05
and p < .07 is “not itself statistically significant.”49 Indeed, some researchers
contend “that a finding of ‘statistical’ significance, or the lack of it, statistical
insignificance, is on its own almost valueless, a meaningless parlor game.”50
In challenging the convention of statistical significance, these scholars argue
that the effect size of the correlation is more important than the probability
level for dismissing the null hypothesis of no effect.51 Nonetheless, for our
own empirical work in the field of judicial decision-making, where we
believe that the first question remains whether an association between
selected variables actually does exist,52 we cautiously adhere to the p < .05
(or smaller) standard to report a finding.
Accordingly, in the present study, we regard an observed correlation
found between variables in our study as reliable only when it is statistically
significant at the p < .05 or 95% probability level or better in one of our two
primary models—clustering at the (1) judge or (2) circuit levels. When that
association in a primary model is statistically significant or marginally
significant in the alternative primary model as well, we express greater
confidence in the reliability of that finding. When empirical scholars refer to
a statistical correlation as “marginally significant,” they typically mean that
the probability level approaches, but does not reach, statistical significance,
usually at the p < .10 level.53 To be clear, however, marginal significance is
not our standard for reporting a finding, but rather is corroboration that a
48. Stated technically, statistical significance measures the likelihood that an estimated
regression coefficient for an explanatory variable was generated by random variation when the
true coefficient value is zero. Significance at the .05 level means that we can be 95% confident
that the actual coefficient is not zero, which thus allows us to draw the inference that there is a
correlation between the explanatory (independent) variable and the dependent variable.
49. See Andrew Gelman & Hal Stern, The Difference Between “Significant” and “Not Significant”
Is Not Itself Statistically Significant, 60 AM. STATISTICIAN 328, 328 (2006).
50. STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE:
HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 2 (2008).
51. See id.
52. But see id. at 4–5 (criticizing the statistical significance test as failing to “ask how much”
and instead “ask[ing] ‘whether,’” and asserting that “[e]xistence, the question of whether, is
interesting [but] it is not scientific”).
53. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision To Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1353, 1375 (2009); Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a
Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 346 n.20 (2010); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1302 n.204 (2005). See generally Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d
1301, 1314 n.58 (Cal. 1980) (“Normally in the social sciences, a ‘p’ value of .05 is said to be
‘statistically significant.’ Values between .05 and .10 are said to be ‘marginally significant,’ and a
‘p’ value of .01 is considered ‘highly significant.’ A ‘p’ value above .10 is generally said to be
‘not significant.’”).
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finding in one model remains reasonably robust in another model. For the
reader who believes our strict approach to be unduly conservative or who
wishes for more detailed information, we have made our data set and other
information available on-line, including regression analyses of our primary
models complete with probability values for every independent variable.54
We do agree that, beyond statistical significance, the substantive size of
the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable deserves
central attention. As Professor Frank Cross reminds us, “the reader should
not place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, because
such a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not
prove the substantive significance of that correlation.”55 As Cross
emphasizes, “[o]ne must also consider the magnitude of the association.”56
In the discussion that follows, we chart most statistically significant findings
in terms of predicted probabilities, along with confidence intervals, to
describe the substantive size of the effect as well.
TABLE 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION DECISIONS,
FEDERAL COURTS, 1996–2005
Model 1:
Standard Errors
Adjusted for Clusters
by Judge

Model 2:
Standard Errors
Adjusted for Clusters
by Circuit

Case Type
Regulation

.435

(.378)

.435

(.633)

Public Education
(Elementary)

.714

(.378)

.714*

(.332)

Public Education
(Secondary/Higher)

.689

(.418)

.689

(.388)

Private Education

1.005*

(.438)

1.005*

(.501)

Religious Meetings

1.040

(.539)

1.040

(.725)

Religious Expression

1.113***

(.313)

1.113**

(.363)

Zoning

.364

(.369)

.364

(.569)

Prisoner

.971**

(.340)

.971

(.531)

.642

(.339)

.642

(.457)

Employment Discrimination

54.
55.
56.

See supra note 28.
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007).
Id.

A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/10/2012 12:13 PM

243

MUSLIMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Model 1

Model 2

Case Type
Exemption from AntiDiscrimination Laws

1.766***

(.422)

1.766**

(.606)

-.502

(.402)

-.502

(.731)

Catholic

-.049

(.246)

-.049

(.458)

Mainline Protestant

-.016

(.375)

-.016

(.511)

Baptist

-.087

(.346)

-.087

(.329)

Christian Variation

.445

(.443)

.445

(.355)

Seventh-Day Adventist

-.252

(.422)

-.252

(.696)

Jehovah’s Witness

-.307

(.457)

-.307

(.860)

Jewish Orthodox

.413

(.281)

.413

(.397)

Jewish Other

-.309

(.279)

-.309

(.443)

-.767***

(.218)

-.767

(.399)

.253

(.283)

.253

(.561)

Criminal
Claimant Religion

Muslim
Native American
Rastafarian

.696*

(.355)

.696

(.612)

1.048**

(.408)

1.048

(.627)

White Separatist

-.275

(.406)

-.275

(.514)

Black Separatist

-2.294**

(.740)

-2.294*

(.939)

Other

-.210

(.216)

-.210

(.371)

Institutional Religious
Claimant

.501*

(.201)

.501

(.327)

Defensive Free Exercise
Claim

.493

(.313)

.493

(.418)

Catholic

-.012

(.163)

-.012

(.107)

Baptist

-.175

(.259)

-.175

(.216)

Other Christian

-.157

(.245)

-.157

(.135)

Jewish

.019

(.184)

.019

(.212)

Other

-.165

(.355)

-.165

(.207)

None

-.070

(.185)

-.070

(.176)

Religious Correlation
Between Judge and Claimant

-.607*

(.292)

-.607*

(.269)

Buddhist

Judge Religion

A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

244

10/10/2012 12:13 PM

[Vol. 98:231

IOWA LAW REVIEW
Model 1:

Model 2:

Judge Sex and Race
Sex (Female)

.162

(.163)

.162

(.106)

African American

.203

(.212)

.203

(.245)

Latino

.468

(.267)

.468*

(.224)

Asian

1.239**

(.392)

1.239***

(.167)

Common Space Score

-.136

(.180)

-.136

(.147)

ABA Rating—Above
Qualified

.055

(.135)

.055

(.150)

ABA Rating—Below
Qualified

.322

(.219)

.322

(.176)

Seniority on Federal Bench

-.001

(.001)

-.001

(.001)

Elite Law School

-.051

(.128)

-.051

(.070)

Military

.079

(.146)

.079

(.131)

Government

-.086

(.122)

-.086

(.102)

State or Local Judge

-.112

(.136)

-.112

(.149)

Law Professor

.303

(.159)

.303*

(.120)

Catholic Percentage

-.010

(.005)

-.010*

(.004)

Jewish Percentage

.002

(.012)

.002

(.012)

Adherence Rate

.011

(.006)

.011

(.007)

Boerne

.104

(.249)

.104

(.403)

After 9/11

.092

(.223)

.092

(.338)

Year of Decision

-.009

(.050)

-.009

(.081)

(Constant)

16.375

(98.957)

16.375

(160.806)

Pseudo R2

.091

.091

Percent Explained

67.26

67.26

N

1631

1631

Judge Ideology or Attitude
Factors

Judge Employment Background

Community Demographics

Precedent and Timing Variables

Notes: Free Exercise Successful Outcome = 1.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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B. RELIGIOUS CLAIMANT VARIABLES: IDENTITY AND CODING
FIGURE 1

RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE CLAIMANTS BY RELIGION AS PERCENTAGE OF OBSERVATIONS,
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TO DECEMBER 31, 2005

Black Separatist
2.0%

White Separatist
2.1%
Buddhist
1.7%

Native American
6.3%

Other
11.0%

Mainline
Protestant
3.2%

Rastafarian
2.8%

Catholic
8.0%

Muslim
17.0%

Baptist
2.5%
Christian
(Other)
28.5%

Jewish (Other)
5.9%
Jewish
(Orthodox)
4.4%
Christian
Variation
1.3%

Seventh-Day
Adventist
1.7%

Jehovah's
Witness
1.7%

For the 1631 observations in Religious Free Exercise/Accommodations
cases in which the religious affiliation of claimants could be determined, we
coded claimants57 into sixteen general categories, for which dummy
variables were created.

57. In the rare case in which claimants from more than one religious background were
involved in a case, the affiliation of the lead claimant was coded.
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TABLE 2
CLAIMANTS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
Religious Affiliation

Percent

(n)

Catholic

8.0%

(n = 130)

Mainline Protestant

3.2%

(n = 53)

Baptist

2.5%

(n = 41)

Christian (Other)
(primarily members of non-denominational,
evangelical, and fundamentalist churches)

28.5%

(n = 465)

Christian (Variation)
(Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Unitarians)

1.3%

(n = 22)

Seventh-Day Adventist

1.7%

(n = 28)

Jehovah’s Witness

1.7%

(n = 28)

Jewish (Orthodox)

4.4%

(n = 72)

Jewish (Other)

5.9%

(n = 96)

Muslim

17.0%

(n = 277)

Native American

6.3%

(n = 103)

Rastafarian

2.8%

(n = 45)

Buddhist

1.7%

(n = 27)

White Separatist

2.1%

(n = 34)

Black Separatist

2.0%

(n = 33)

Other (including Sikh, Wiccan, and New Age)

10.9%

(n = 177)

TOTAL

100%

(n = 1631)

By examining pleadings and other court documents through the
PACER federal court dockets system, we were able to confirm religious
affiliation for a much larger proportion of claimants than in our prior 1986–
1995 study, even in cases where the claimant’s religion was not identified in
the opinion itself. In the present 1996–2005 study, we could not determine
the religious affiliation of 7.7% of the claimants (n = 136). By contrast, in
our 1986–1995 study, we had been unable to determine the religious
affiliation of 19.1% of claimants—a figure nearly three times higher than in
the current study. In both this and the prior studies, we were forced to treat
these observations as missing when analyzing claimant-religious-affiliation
dummy variables.
While no manifestly obvious candidate emerged as the appropriate
reference variable, we selected “Christian (Other)” because it collected
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together various Christian adherents without a clear denominational
association and thus appeared to be most representative of the Christian
mainstream. Not incidentally, this was the largest category, which is
ordinarily preferable as a reference category.
In our coding of Muslim claimants (which proved to be the claimant
variable of most interest for this period),58 we included the full diversity of
American Islam. We followed in the steps of prior research, notably
including the Pew Research Center’s and Gallup, Inc.’s surveys of Muslim
Americans (which we address later in this Article),59 in relying upon selfidentification by the individual. Accordingly, those religious-liberty claimants
who identified as Sunni or Shi’i (often rendered in western media as
“Shia”), as well as those who reported they were Muslim without any
additional affiliation and those who said they belonged to the Nation of
Islam (“NOI”), were included in our data set.60
The NOI diverges in doctrine from Sunni and Shi’i Islam in several
ways. The NOI elevates founder Fard Muhammad, and subsequent leader
Elijah Muhammad, to an incarnation of God and a holy prophet,
respectively, while orthodox Islam regards God as wholly other than human
and believes the Prophet Muhammad to whom the Qur’an was revealed to
be the final prophet.61 Moreover, the NOI’s emphasis on race stands in
contrast to the universalism of mainstream Islam. While some Islamic studies
scholars see the NOI as moving toward Sunni Islam,62 others scholars
question whether the NOI accepts the central religious tenets of Islam.63
Nonetheless, the NOI has been a highly visible representation of Islam
in the United States and has been a way station for many Americans who

58. In our companion article, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench, we report additional
results of our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation study for 1996–2005, including our
findings that cases involving exemption from anti-discrimination laws were significantly more
likely to result in pro-accommodation rulings and that Asian and Latino judges as well as judges
who were former law professors were particularly favorable to Free Exercise and
Accommodation claims. Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17.
59. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 76
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://pewresearch.org/
assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf (providing survey results on question about religious
preferences); THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, MUSLIM AMERICANS: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 10
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://www.gallup.com/
strategicconsulting/153572/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-National-Portrait.aspx
(explaining
that respondents “self-identified as Muslims”).
60. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 22 (including those affiliated with
the NOI among American Muslims).
61. On the doctrine of the NOI, see generally Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islam Among African
Americans: An Overview, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: HOPE, FEARS, AND
ASPIRATIONS 222, 237–43 (Zahid H. Bukhari et al. eds., 2004).
62. See Aminah Beverly McCloud, Conceptual Discourse: Living as a Muslim in a Pluralistic
Society, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 73, 82.
63. Ansari, supra note 61, at 237, 259.
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later associated with Sunni Islam,64 most notably Malcolm X and two of the
sons of Elijah Muhammad.65 In any event, few claimants in our study
volunteered that they were affiliated with the NOI, most declaring
themselves to be Muslim without more specific description (a few of whom
undoubtedly were members of the NOI).66
Relying on self-identification by claimants as Muslim has further merit
in this context, where the study seeks to uncover the attitudes of judicial
decision-makers toward religious-liberty claimants’ proclaimed affiliations.
Moreover, for Muslim claimants, Free Exercise claims typically involved
prayer and worship rituals and dietary requirements,67 subjects on which the
NOI has adopted orthodox Muslim rules.68
By contrast, we separately coded members of black separatist religious
groups—such as the Moorish Temple and the Five Percenters.69 While
sharing some beliefs and holy days with mainstream Islam, these sects have
diverged even further (such as eschewing prayer to Allah in the belief that
all black men are gods),70 and their adherents distinctively identified
themselves as belonging to those sects rather than being Muslims.
III. THE RESULTS: THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE IN RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY CASES
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON MUSLIM RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY CLAIMANTS ACROSS
TWENTY-YEAR SPAN OF STUDY
Across the now twenty-year span of decisions in our continuing
empirical study of religious-liberty rulings in the lower federal courts,

64. See Farida Jalalzai, The Politics of Muslims in America, 2 POL. & RELIGION 163, 166
(2009) (“[M]ost African-American[ ] [Muslims] are converts to Islam, many initially entering as
followers of the Nation of Islam.”).
65. See Ansari, supra note 61, at 243–47, 251–54.
66. In the prison setting, from which arise most of the Muslim religious-liberty claims in
our study, Sunni Muslims significantly outnumber members of the NOI. While religious
demographic data on prisoners is not readily available for all prison settings, detailed data
pertinent to the era of our study from New York state prisons in 2003 and a study on Ohio state
prisons published in 2004 suggest that mainstream Muslims outnumber NOI members by more
than three-to-one. See DAN BERNSTEIN, STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION OF UNDERCUSTODY POPULATION 5 tbl.2.1 (2003) (reporting 9868 prisoners
identifying with Islam generally and 2900 with NOI); Nawal H. Ammar, Robert R. Weaver &
Sam Saxon, Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons, 48 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 414, 421 tbl.2 (2004) (using a sample from Ohio prisons containing 79
prisoners who affiliated with American Muslim Mission, 26 with the NOI, and 25 with no
preference or who attended mosques from either affiliation).
67. See infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
68. See Ansari, supra note 61, at 258 (noting that Minister Louis Farrakhan has effected
changes in religious rituals leaning toward mainstream Islam).
69. On the Moorish Temple and the Five Percenters, see Ansari, supra note 61, at 235–36,
259.
70. See Self-Allah v. Annucci, No. 97-CV-607(H), 1999 WL 299310, at *2–6 (W.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 1999) (reporting self-description of “Five Percenters” about their religion).
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evidence that Muslim claimants have been at a disadvantage has been
accumulating. In our 1986–1995 study, we refrained from describing the
evidence we had found as a finding, suggesting instead that the matter
deserved further attention and additional study. Now having examined
religious-liberty decisions over an additional ten-year span, we do find—with
the conventions of statistical significance fully satisfied—that Muslim
claimants were indeed significantly less likely than non-Muslims to
successfully raise Religious Free Exercise and Accommodation claims,
especially in the federal courts of appeals.
In our 1986–1995 study, the Muslim claimant variable did not
approach significance in our standard model (reaching only the 83%
probability level).71 Interestingly, when district court and court of appeals
judges were examined using separate regression analyses, the Muslim
variable did rise to the p < .01 level (or 99% probability level) for statistical
significance, and in the same negative direction.72 Both because our primary
model combined these two sets of judges and because we found it odd that
the variable would be significant for each separately but slide well out of
significance when they were combined, we reported those results but did not
present them as a finding. We additionally found that Muslims were
significantly less likely to succeed when claiming unequal treatment or
discrimination.73
“[A]t least pending further study,” we concluded in that prior 1986–
1995 study, “there is some evidence that adherents to Islam, apparently
alone among the non-Christian religious faiths, may encounter greater
resistance in pressing claims for religious accommodation in federal
courts.”74
Having progressed forward another ten years, examining federal court
decisions from 1996 to 2005, the present study confirms the informed
hunch we had at the conclusion of that earlier study nearly a decade ago.
Among all of the diverse categories of religious claimants included in the
primary models of our present study, Muslims nearly alone were significantly
and powerfully associated with a negative outcome before the federal courts
(the minor exception being Black Separatists, for whom a significant
negative association also persisted, mostly in prisoner cases).75 Claimants
from other religious communities were nearly twice as likely to prevail as
Muslims.
In our primary regression model (clustering standard errors at the
judge level), the variable for Muslim claimants was highly significant at the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566–67.
See Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 17.
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p < .001 level (or 99.9% probability level). The Muslim variable remains
marginally significant in the alternative model (clustering standard errors at
the circuit level), falling inside the p < .06 level, as well as in alternative
models using political party as the proxy for judicial ideology.
As explained in greater detail in our companion article describing the
results of the Establishment Clause phase of our study, our primary model
for religious-liberty decisions combines rulings by both district court and
court of appeals judges for unitary analysis.76 In resolving the central
constitutional issues in a case, trial and appellate courts share parallel
responsibilities. The deferential standard of appellate review that is
ordinarily applied to a trial court’s factual findings is subject to the
“constitutional fact” exception for “factual” disputes that lie at the core of a
constitutional question.77 For these and other reasons, we concluded that
expanding our empirical study beyond appellate judges and evaluating the
behavior of a larger and more inclusive set of lower federal judges has much
merit, especially in this context of rulings on constitutional and parallel
statutory claims.
However, in this Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of our study,
when judges from each of the lower federal courts are examined separately
in the primary model, the Muslim variable falls well out of significance for
district court judges, while remaining highly significant for court of appeals
judges (at the p < .001 or 99.9% probability level). As reported in Figure 3
below, the disparity in success rates between Muslims and non-Muslims is
even greater when court of appeals judge rulings are examined separately
rather than combined with district court judge rulings. Our findings for
court of appeals judges may also be more solidly grounded. Our data set of
all digested Westlaw opinions includes a larger share of the universe of
published and unpublished federal appellate decisions (excluding only
summary dispositions that were not digested) than is likely to be the case for
district court decisions in the Free Exercise/Accommodation area. In
addition, the disproportion in our study between judicial participations by
federal appellate judges and trial judges is high, with 1236 (75.8%) by court
of appeals judges and 395 (24.2%) by district court judges. Accordingly,
while we report our findings and measure the effect size under both unitary
and separate analyses, the reader may reasonably conclude that the findings
in this study apply primarily or with more emphasis to federal appellate
judges.

76. See Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1208–10.
77. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. In the Free Exercise context, most of
the statute-based claims are parallel to claims founded directly on the First Amendment, with
some exception for discrimination-based claims.
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B. MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE
Our finding that Muslim claimants were less likely than claimants of
other religions to prevail when raising religious-liberty claims in the lower
federal courts, and most specifically in the courts of appeals, is reliable,
confirmed by conventions of statistical significance. And the size of that
effect is substantial. As shown in Figure 2, holding all other independent
variables constant at their means, the predicted probability that a Muslim
claimant
would
succeed
in
presenting
a
Religious
Free
Exercise/Accommodation claim to an individual federal judge was 22.2%,
while non-Muslim claimants would succeed at a rate of 38.0%.
FIGURE 2
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Muslim Claimant

Non-Muslim Claimant

The vertical lines in Figure 2 represent the 95% confidence intervals
for these two predictions. By “95 percent confidence interval,” statisticians
mean that the interval is “one within which we are 95 percent certain that
the true variable value falls.”78 Thus, while our best estimate is that a Muslim
claimant had a 22.2% likelihood of succeeding on a Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claim, the probability could be as low as 15.6% or
as high as 28.8%. Similarly, while we predict that a non-Muslim claimant
78. ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW 239 (2010); see also Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider,
On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811,
1814 (2006) (“Such is the reality of the statistical world: We can never be certain about our best
guesses (i.e., inferences) because they themselves are based on estimates. We can, however,
report our level of uncertainty (e.g., a confidence interval) about those guesses.”).
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would succeed 38.0% of the time, the probability could be as low as 35.0%
or as high as 41.1%.
The probability that the comparative values would appear both in the
higher end of the interval for a Muslim claimant and in the lower end of the
interval for a non-Muslim claimant is much lower than 5%, strengthening
our confidence that the disparity between the two is not only significant in
statistical probability but quite substantial in size. Indeed, even before
adjusting for other independent variables in a regression, the raw frequency
success rate before federal judges was 37.9% for non-Muslim claimants,
while only 22.7% for Muslims.
When judicial participations from each of the lower federal courts in
our study are examined separately in our primary model, the Muslim
variable falls well out of significance for district court judges but becomes
highly significant (at the p < .001 or 99.9% probability level) for court of
appeals judges. And the magnitude of the effect not only remains
substantial, but increases slightly, for court of appeals judges.
As shown in Figure 3, holding all other independent variables constant,
the predicted probability that a Muslim claimant would succeed in
presenting a Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claim to a federal
court of appeals judge was 21.4%, while non-Muslim claimants succeeded at
a rate of 38.9%.79
FIGURE 3
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY
(COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES ONLY)
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Muslim Claimant

Non-Muslim Claimant

79. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a Muslim claimant before
court of appeals judges ranges from 13.6% to 29.1%, and for non-Muslim claimants from
35.5% to 42.3%.
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To examine whether there was a more specific “9/11 Effect”—that is,
whether there was a shift in the legal landscape for Muslim religious-liberty
claimants following the terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York
City—we also conducted separate but parallel analyses of cases decided both
before and after September 11, 2001. This date restriction produces nearly
an even division of the 1996–2005 decisions, with 48% of judicial
participations occurring before 9/11 and 52% afterward. When separated
into sets of pre-9/11 cases and post-9/11 cases, the Muslim variable
remained significant for the pre-9/11 period (January 1, 1996 to September
10, 2001) and slips barely out of significance but stays inside the p < .06 level
for the post-9/11 period (September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2005).
In raw frequencies, Muslim claimants achieved a favorable response
from judges at a rate of 24.4% before 9/11 and then at a slightly lower rate
of 21.2% afterward. When all other explanatory variables are held constant
in a regression analysis, the predicted probability of success for a Muslim
claimant is 21.9% before 9/1180 and rises slightly to 24.1% after 9/11.81 In
any event, these differences are relatively small and their confidence
intervals preclude any confident conclusion about genuine movement in
either direction between these two periods. In addition, we included a
control variable for 9/11, which did not prove significant in our primary
model, although that 9/11 control variable did rise to significance in a
separate regression analysis of prisoner-only cases before the courts of
appeals.
Moreover, assuming the post-9/11 months were perceived by Muslim
Americans as a period of backlash against Islam, we would expect those
perceptions to play a strategic role in their decisions whether or not to
litigate their religious-liberty claims. Under the Priest–Klein Hypothesis,
plaintiff win rates in cases that actually are litigated to judgment will trend
toward 50% regardless of the substantive standard of law.82 Rational litigants
will adjust their behavior by agreeing to settle rather than continue with
litigation based on their predictions of success in light of that legal standard,
meaning that only close cases will actually proceed to trial.
To be sure, the Priest–Klein Hypothesis is “not an iron law,”83 is based
solely on economic determinants for settlement and litigation,84 and
80. For the pre-9/11 period, the 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a
Muslim claimant ranges from 11.4% to 32.5%, and for non-Muslim claimants from 34.4% to
42.8%.
81. For the post-9/11 period, the 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a
Muslim claimant ranges from 14.5% to 33.6%, and for non-Muslim claimants from 32.1% to
40.5%.
82. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 5, 8, 14–15, 17 (1984).
83. Matthew C. Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based
Theory of Litigation at the World Trade Organization, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 385, 397 (2011).
84. Priest & Klein, supra note 82, at 4.
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assumes “primarily that the parties have equal stakes in the litigation.”85 In
religious-liberty cases, many persons of faith whose free exercise of religion
is severely burdened by government rules or decisions may feel that they
have no alternative but to press forward with litigation despite a weak
prospect for success; religious plaintiffs’ requests for accommodation may
have little or no economic benefit or cost; or government defendants may be
less motivated by either financial impact or litigation costs in deciding
whether and how to defend against such claims.
Nonetheless, even in the religious-liberty context, litigation trends
surely are affected to some degree by litigation costs and rational predictions
of success or failure in court, as well as by strategic considerations regarding
public perception and the impact of negative court rulings. Thus, we would
expect Muslims in the post-9/11 period to withhold more religious-liberty
claims, choosing instead to accept the burdens and costs of nonaccommodation when possible, or to withdraw from sectors of public and
economic life if necessary to avoid a conflict over religious principle. During
such a difficult period, and perhaps more generally, we would expect
Muslims to resort to the courts only when their claims were strongest on the
merits. If these assumptions are correct, such rational responses to a
challenging situation may explain why success rates for Muslim religiousliberty claimants who litigated after 9/11 did not fall or may have even risen
slightly.
In sum, we have confidence in the overall finding that Muslim claimants
generally had a lower success rate than non-Muslim claimants in the lower
federal courts (and especially before judges of the courts of appeals)
between 1996 and 2005. Although the evidence is mixed and the possibility
of strategic adjustment cannot be ignored, there is no strong evidence of a
specific “9/11 effect” leading to a marked decline in the Muslim success rate
in Religious Free Exercise claims following the 2001 terrorist attacks. For
the ten-year span from 1996 to 2005, our findings translate into a predicted
success rate for Muslim claimants that is only slightly better than half that for
other religious claimants. Especially in light of the trend we observed in our
1986–1995 study,86 the Muslim deficit in religious-liberty litigation success
appears to be real and persistent at least through 2005.

85. Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political Orientations Affect Case
Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2010); see also Priest & Klein, supra note 82, at 24
(explaining that the model assumes “that the stakes of the relevant disputes are symmetric to
plaintiffs and defendants”).
86. See supra Part III.A.
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IV. AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT ISLAM AND ALTERNATE THEORIES OF THE
MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE
A. THE AMERICAN PROMISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE
Like Catholic and Jewish immigrants before them, Muslims coming to
America (as well as the increasing numbers of native-born Muslims) strive to
maintain their identity and hold fast to their core beliefs while integrating
into the mainstream of American life. Whether “the robust promise [of] the
American experiment [in religious liberty] still holds”87 will be tested in the
coming years by the experiences of Muslims as fellow citizens, coworkers,
and neighbors. If that promise is kept, that message of freedom may
resonate well beyond our own borders.
Although it came only after a struggle spanning many decades,
Catholics have succeeded in realizing the American Dream—prospering
economically, thriving in society, and achieving parity in political,
educational, and employment activity—without sacrificing their faith. And
that success played no small role in the development of a better
understanding of the virtues of religious liberty within the universal Catholic
Church. In his famous book, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the
American Proposition, published in 1960 on the eve of the Second Vatican
Council, as well as in earlier theological writings, American Jesuit John
Courtney Murray offered the success of the unique American experiment in
religious liberty as evidence of a new moral truth consistent with the natural
law tradition of the Catholic Church.88
While also drawing on the traditional Catholic principle of conscience
and the work of other Catholic scholars such as French philosopher Jacques
Maritain on the dignity of the human person,89 the Second Vatican Council
was greatly influenced by Murray and his observations about religious liberty
in the American context.90 At the close of the Council in 1965, Pope Paul VI
promulgated Dignitatis Humanae (The Declaration on Religious Freedom)
formally declaring as Catholic teaching that “the right to religious freedom
has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person.”91 Writing about

87. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, at xiii
(2d ed. 2005).
88. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).
89. Catherine M. A. McCauliff, Jacques Maritain’s Embrace of Religious Pluralism and the
Declaration on Religious Freedom, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 593, 594, 601 (2011).
90. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 331–53 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, Francis Bacon Takes on the Ghouls, 3
GREEN BAG 2D 447, 454–55 (2000) (reviewing JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000)).
91. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE § 2 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/
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Murray and the Second Vatican Council, Judge John Noonan observes that
“the Declaration on Religious Freedom would not have come into existence
without the American contribution and the experiment that began with
Madison.”92
As Professor Kristine Kalanges writes, “Catholics in the United States
were witnesses to the fact that a truth-proclaiming religion could prosper in
a pluralistic society.”93 Likewise, she observes, “[i]nsofar as they thrive here,
American Muslims . . . could bear witness to the Muslim world that religious
freedom is compatible with the practice of (at least certain visions of)
Islam.”94 While such a development has “the potential to be profound,”
Kalanges warns that it is not inevitable.95
Unfortunately, for at least three reasons, each of which is discussed in
more detail in succeeding parts of this Article, believers in Islam may face a
steeper climb to full-fledged acceptance into the American mainstream than
did Catholics and Jews.96 Muslims may find that accommodations from their
new countrymen are less forthcoming than those that were grudgingly and
gradually granted to Catholics and Jews on their journeys through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
First, many Americans perceive Islam’s central tenets to be further
distant from the religious mainstream in the United States than was the
divergence of Catholic beliefs and Jewish traditions from the Protestant
Christianity that dominated the American religious landscape a century and
more ago.97 Over time, Catholics and Jews have been elevated to “equal
partnership status in the American religious triumvirate.”98 With America
now increasingly described as “Judeo-Christian” in a more expansive
compass of religious traditions, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are more
likely today to find some theological common ground, emphasizing a

ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html
(English
translation).
92. NOONAN, supra note 90, at 353.
93. KRISTINE KALANGES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC LAW: TOWARD A
WORLD LEGAL TRADITION 163 (2012).
94. Id. at 164.
95. Id.
96. Cf. Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the Old Anti-Catholicism, 44 CONN. L. REV.
1001, 1003–04, 1013–17 (2012) (describing how religious-liberty cases today often connect
deeply with the nineteenth century history of anti-Catholicism in the United States, such as the
case of a female Muslim police officer in Philadelphia who was prohibited from wearing a veil
by citation to a still-extant Pennsylvania statute enacted in the nineteenth century to exclude
Catholic priests and nuns from public employment because they wore cleric garb).
97. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 47 (1996) (referring to the “Protestant consensus” that prevailed at least until the late
nineteenth century).
98. Id. at 58; see also WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT—CATHOLIC—JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (Anchor Books rev. ed. 1960) (providing an analysis of Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism in modern American culture).
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monotheistic unity, similarities in worship practices, some common Western
history, and a connection to the Bible.
At some future point, Muslims may be added to Catholics, Protestants,
and Jews as within the common faith heritage of Americans because all of
the “Abrahamic religions tend to share a substantial ethical foundation.”99
But we have not yet reached the historical or cultural point where Islam has
been received by public approbation to full partnership in an American
religious “quadruple alliance.”100 For the moment, in the eyes of most
Americans, Islam remains an outsider and minority religion in the United
States.101
Moreover, while beyond the scope of this study, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that a racial element is also at play. The majority of followers of
Islam in the United States are non-white, thus making Muslims in America a
minority in ethnic and racial terms as well as in religious. According to the
Pew Research Center, in 2007, 38% of American Muslims identified
themselves as white (although a substantial majority are actually of Arab
origin),102 26% as black, 20% as Asian, and 16% as mixed or other.103 A
2009 Gallup Poll found a larger percentage of Muslim Americans self99. Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Faith and the Attorney–Client Relationship: A Muslim Perspective, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1998); see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, PLURALISM IN MUSLIM–
CHRISTIAN RELATIONS 6 (2008), available at http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/files/20080401_
Pluralism_in_Muslim-Christian_Relations.pdf (“Both [Islam and Christianity] recognize and
worship God as Creator, sustainer and Judge, share a belief in common prophets and in divine
revelation to humankind, believe in moral responsibility and accountability, the last judgment
and eternal reward and punishment.”). The “Three Grand Tenets” of Islam—monotheism,
final judgment, and divine intervention in history—have parallels in Christian and Jewish
teaching. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ’A) 104–14 (2011). Even should
Islam join Protestant Christianity, Catholic Christianity, and Judaism in the religious
mainstream, recently departed Professor Steven Gey feared that a “reduction of all major
branches of Western religious thought into a generic brand of monotheism” would, at least in
the application of the Establishment Clause, “lead[] to the embrace of religious
majoritarianism” to the detriment of those falling outside of that theological or sociological
consensus. Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2007).
100. The term “quadruple alliance” originated with various strategic alliances among
European powers, most prominently the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Russia, Prussia, and
Austria which followed the Napoleonic wars. See Myrna Boyce, The Diplomatic Relations of England
with the Quadruple Alliance 1815–1830, U. IOWA STUD., Nov. 1918, at 1, 5, available at
http://ia600406.us.archive.org/23/items/diplomaticrelati00boyc/diplomaticrelati00boyc.pdf.
101. See infra Part IV.B.
102. See Ilyas Ba-Yunus & Kassim Kone, Muslim Americans: A Demographic Report, in MUSLIMS’
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 299, 317 (reporting that the largest
ethnic group of American Muslims are those of Arab origin (32%), followed by mostly African
American Muslims (29%)).
103. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 17–18. In a 2011 follow-up survey, the
Pew Research Center found similar racial demographics, with 30% of Muslims identifying as
white, 23% as black, 21% as Asian, 6% as Hispanic, and 19% as other or mixed. PEW RESEARCH
CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 16
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-American-Report.pdf.
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identifying as African American (35%) and fewer classifying themselves as
White (28%).104 While we were not able to code the religious claimants in
our data set by race,105 we expect that a substantial majority of Muslim
claimants in the present study were non-white.106
Second, American Muslims today face cultural and political obstacles
beyond and different from those that Catholics and Jews encountered from
a Protestant–Christian hegemony in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century. In today’s America, Muslims face opposition not only from
members of other religions in America who regard them as religiously
discordant or theologically deviant, but also from a growing number of
secularists in certain circles of American cultural and political life.107
Professor Noah Feldman describes two opposing camps in the debate over
the proper role of religion in American public life—”values evangelicals”
and “legal secularists.”108 Neither camp appears at present to be favorably
disposed toward full-fledged participation by Muslims as people of faith in
American public life. While “values evangelicals” might be expected to view
Muslims as allies on certain social issues, suspicion and fear by many
evangelical Christians hold Muslims apart.109

104. 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 10, 20.
105. In coding claimants for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation by religion, we did
not and could not also code them by race. Because of the nature of the claims being raised,
focused as they were on the claimant’s religion-based conflict with the government, the race of
the claimants was not consistently revealed in court documents. While we might assume that
most (but not all) followers of Native American religious traditions were themselves Native
Americans (and claimants of that faith were not statistically significant in our study), we could
not make similar assumptions about the other religious groupings included in the analysis.
106. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, see supra Part II.B; infra Part IV.B.3, nearly threequarters of Muslim claimants in our data set are prisoners, and the overwhelming majority of
Muslim prisoners are black. Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and
Military as an Operational Base: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., & Homeland Sec. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Waller Testimony] (testimony of
J. Michael Waller, Annenberg Professor of International Communication, Institute of World
Politics), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-search.cfm (select
hearing year “2003” and search witness testimony for “Waller”; then follow “Dr. Michael Waller”
hyperlink) (stating that Muslim inmates in prison “are overwhelmingly black with a small, but
growing Hispanic minority”).
107. See infra Part IV.B.2.
108. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH–STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT
WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 7–8 (2005).
109. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., CONTINUING DIVIDE IN VIEWS OF ISLAM AND VIOLENCE 2
(2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/2011/03/714.pdf (reporting that 60% of
white evangelical Protestants regard Islam as more likely to encourage violence than other
religions); Mohammed Nimer, Muslims in the American Body Politic, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 145, 157 (describing relationships between
Muslims and the Christian Right as “uncertain and highly confrontational at times”); James M.
Penning, Americans’ Views of Muslims and Mormons: A Social Identity Theory Approach, 2 POL. &
RELIGION 277, 287 (2009) (reporting on a study showing that “evangelical Protestants in the
United States tend to hold particularly negative views of Muslims”).

A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

MUSLIMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

10/10/2012 12:13 PM

259

Third, just as Muslims began to rise in significant numbers and to
positions of prominence in the United States, Islamic-extremist-inspired
terrorism has become a serious threat to national and international security.
Even as they write encouragingly about finding meaningful accommodations
for Muslim religious tenets within the context of American constitutionalism
and political liberalism, Professors John Witte and Joel Nichols warn of setbacks due to a “cultural backlash against Muslims prompted by 9/11, 7/7,
Fort Hood, or the bloody and unpopular wars against Islamicist extremists in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.”110 Based on our empirical study of federal
court religious-liberty decisions, we fear that religious liberty may become a
casualty of that cultural backlash.111
We should emphasize that our study focused on religious-liberty claims
in court. While our readers will be aware of troubling developments in other
dimensions of American life, our findings are grounded in data from a
particular time period before judges of the lower federal courts. At the same
time, we believe that trends in the judicial reception of religious-liberty
claims flow back into society and influence societal attitudes.112 Moreover,
the impartial and even-handed treatment of claimants by judges, regardless
of religious identity, is a cardinal value in itself. Thus, judicial responses to
claims for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation in the federal courts
comprise an important chapter in the modern story of American religious
liberty.
B. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE IN RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY
CASES
We discuss below four alternative theories to explain—or, in one
instance, explain away—our finding that Muslim claimants suffer a
significant and powerful disadvantage in presenting religious-liberty claims
to the lower federal courts:
First, as the “Minority Religion Disadvantage” thesis, we consider the
possible impact of a general cultural antipathy toward Islam as yet another
minority religion outside the modern American triumvirate of
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism.
Second, as the “Culture War” thesis, we discuss the growing secularism
in certain sectors of society, along with opposition to groups holding
traditional religious values. Because most American Muslims maintain what
are conventionally seen as conservative views on many social issues, we
110. John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?, 2010
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 122, 126–27, available at http://www.irla.org/assets/files/Fides/Fides2
010.pdf.
111. See infra Parts IV.B.4 & V.
112. See Marie A. Failinger, Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960, 32 B.C. J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 1, 2 (2012) (“The courts can both reflect American social attitudes and shape them,
countering misperceptions and stereotypes that result in social and legal harm to minorities.”).
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consider the possibility that negative responses to Muslim religious-liberty
claims may be generated by the wider “Culture War” on social and moral
controversies that persists in American social and political discourse.
Third, as the “Muslims Deserve To Lose” thesis, we evaluate the
possibility that claims made by Muslims are distinctively weaker on their
merits and thus deserve to be rejected at a higher rate than claims made by
those from other religious communities.
Fourth, as the “Islam Viewed as Dangerous” thesis, which we believe is
the most likely explanation for the Muslim disadvantage, we describe the
fears harbored by many Americans that followers of Islam pose a security
danger to the United States, especially in an era of terrorist anxiety. We
further explain that these negative perceptions of Islam and its followers in
America bear little resemblance to reality.
Then, in the next Part of the Article, we suggest that the persistent
uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its followers appears to have
filtered into the attitudes of such well-educated and independent elites as
federal judges.
1. The “Minority Religion Disadvantage” Thesis
The conventional wisdom has been that adherents to minority religions
are more likely to fail when pressing religious-liberty claims in court, while
followers of mainstream Christianity are more likely to succeed. Given the
history of discrimination and persecution against religious minorities,
scholars have understandably believed that “the scales generally tip in favor
of Judeo-Christian beliefs, and against those outside that framework.”113
In our prior 1986–1995 study, we did not find that followers of minority
religions generally were significantly less likely to secure a favorable hearing
from federal judges.114 In fact, counter to the popular narrative, we found
that adherents to traditionalist Christian faiths, notably Catholics and
Baptists, entered the courthouse doors at a distinct disadvantage.115 And
now, in the present 1996–2005 study, Muslims are nearly alone in suffering
a disadvantage in religious-liberty litigation. The only exception involves
claims by adherents to small black-separatist sects, some three-quarters of
which arose in the context of criminal proceedings and prisons, where racial
tensions can pose security threats for both correctional officers and other
prisoners.116

113. Verna C. Sánchez, All Roads Are Good: Beyond the Lexicon of Christianity in Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 35 n.12 (1997).
114. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1033–37; Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 562–67.
115. See supra note 114.
116. See Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 17. On the regression results
for and the coding of Black Separatists, see supra Table 1 and notes 69–70 and accompanying
text.
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Professor William Marshall once argued that “[a] court is more likely to
find against a claimant on definitional grounds when the religion is bizarre,
relative to the cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a religious belief
is insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms,
incredulous.”117 One of us has “submit[ted] something of the opposite may
be as common . . . given the natural human tendency to respond more
vigorously to the perceived threat next door than to the peculiarity on the
far side of town”118:
Because such unconventional thinking or conduct is so distant
from our own, and because the actors are so remote from our own
world and experiences, we are less likely to compare those attitudes
and actions against our own beliefs and practices . . . . Nor are we
likely to feel threatened, again precisely because the perspective
involved is so alien and thus so far removed from our day-to-day
life.119
Thus, when a judge hearing a religious-liberty case encounters what he or
she sees as a novel or eccentric religious exercise by a follower of a peculiar
religion, that judge may be more willing to direct tolerance of that religious
practice as perhaps unusual, but harmless and easily accommodated.
Moreover, when the believer is part of a small minority religion, we
anticipate that exceptions and accommodations can be more easily
contained with minimal impact. In sum, Free Exercise accommodations to
small, minority religions do not occasion much, if any, real inconvenience to
the majority.
By contrast, when a religion no longer is alien and remote, but instead
is regularly encountered, societal forbearance may be lifted for the practices
of that religion that diverge from majoritarian customs and preferences.
Thus, one of us has argued, “the typical American may be more threatened by
that which is familiar and close at hand, but regarded as morally reprehensible,
than by that which is foreign and remote (culturally if not geographically).”120 In
addition, when the followers of that faith increase in numbers, the sincerity of the
majority’s commitment to religious tolerance is put to the test. In those
circumstances, religious liberty is not merely a high-minded ideal but begins to
have real costs.
For many decades, as Professor John Esposito reminds us, “Islam had
remained invisible on the cognitive maps of most Americans.”121 But today,

117. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
308, 311 (1991).
118. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1042.
119. Id. at 1042–43.
120. Id. at 1043.
121. John L. Esposito, Foreword to MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra
note 61, at xi.
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“Islam and Muslims represent the second largest religion in Europe and the
third in North America.”122
Accordingly, the emergence of Muslims in larger numbers and with greater
prominence in American life is more likely to explain their impaired success in
seeking religious accommodation than the simple fact that they are a minority
and non-Judeo-Christian religion. Indeed, if being a follower of a minority
religion alone was sufficient to undermine the prospects for a religious-liberty
claim, we would expect to find that Jehovah’s Witnesses, practitioners of Native
American religions, and others encountered similar difficulties. But in our
primary models, save for Muslims and Black Separatists, no other religiousgrouping variable reached, or even approached, a similarly negative statistical
significance. In fact, as discussed in more detail in a companion Article, we
found that claimants from two minority religious groups—Rastafarians and
Buddhists—appeared to be more likely to succeed in bringing Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claims, although we expressed doubts about the
reliability of those findings.123
In sum, American Muslims appear to be at a pronounced disadvantage in
obtaining accommodations for religious practices in federal court because they are
Muslims, and not because they fall into a broader category of adherents to
minority religions. The unequal judicial treatment is felt by the members of this
particular faith group, distinct from others. The crucial question remains as to
what it is about the perceptions of Islam held by other Americans that is seen to
justify excluding American Muslims from fully enjoying the benefits of religious
accommodations that are extended to persons of other faiths.
2. The “Culture War: Traditionalist v. Secularist” Thesis
a.

From 1986 to 1995: Traditionalist Christians Less Likely To Succeed in
Religious-Liberty Cases

In our prior study of religious-liberty decisions dating from 1986 to
1995, we found that adherents to traditionalist religions, specifically Roman
Catholics and Baptists, were significantly less likely to succeed in seeking
religious accommodations in the federal courts.124 Based on those results,
“we suggest[ed] that the phenomenon of impaired success for claimants from
these two religious communities may [best] be understood as part of what
Thomas Berg describes as ‘a broader distrust of politically active social
conservatives,’ which now includes both Catholics and evangelical Protestants.”125
When orthodox Catholics and traditionalist Baptists, adhering to
conservative social values and moral principles, resisted, for example,
122. Id.
123. Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 21–25.
124. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 564–66; Sisk, supra note 17, at 1037–38.
125. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 565 (quoting Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism
and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 122 (2001)).
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government regulation of private schools or the application of gay rights
ordinances in certain metropolitan areas, such claims “tend[] to be a shot right
across the bow of the secular ship of state.”126 Given that federal judges are drawn
from the cultural elite, they may react with greater skepticism to claims by
traditionalist Christians that raise familiar and controversial social and cultural
challenges to the social-policy initiatives of secularist governments, especially in
metropolitan areas which tend to lean liberal socially.
So now, with the benefit of additional empirical evidence from our
latest study of decisions from 1996–2005, has the continuing national
controversy over the nature and scope of religious liberty evolved into what
one of us has called “a new conflict between the agenda of a liberal secular
elite and the practices and values of traditional religious believers”?127 And
should a now more visible Islam join the ranks of the traditionalist American
faiths that find themselves engaged in a cultural war with liberal and
secularist political movements?
b.

Muslim American Attitudes on Moral Values, Religion in Public Life, and
Politics

As with Christianity and Judaism, Islam and its American followers are
heterogeneous and multi-faceted. Any attempt to capsulize the nature of
that faith and its followers in theology, religious practice, political ideology,
and social attitudes will unavoidably mischaracterize by inevitable overgeneralization. As Professors Matt A. Barreto and Dino N. Bozonelos remind
us, Muslim Americans are “extremely diverse” in race, religious sect,
language, nation of origin, and history within the United States.128
Still, as with Christianity and Judaism, certain central tenets and
common practices do draw together the broad sweep of those who believe in
Islam, at least in its more orthodox form. Moreover, as Professor Aminah
Beverly McCloud writes, given the challenges that the Islamic community
encountered in the aftermath of 9/11, both newer (mostly immigrant) and
older (native-born) American Muslims in their various communities are
“coming together” with greater appreciation for each other and a
heightened recognition of the need for community discourse and common
understanding.129 Islamic studies scholar Zafar Ishaq Ansari believes “there
are strong reasons to expect an enhanced cohesiveness among American
Muslims in the future.”130 Importantly, when evaluating the dominant
American perception of Islam and its adherents—which, in turn, may shed
light on why Muslims may be disadvantaged in asserting religious-liberty
126. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1045.
127. Id. at 1024.
128. Matt A. Barreto & Dino N. Bozonelos, Democrat, Republican, or None of the Above? The
Role of Religiosity in Muslim American Party Identification, 2 POL. & RELIGION 200, 211 (2009).
129. McCloud, supra note 62, at 82–83.
130. Ansari, supra note 61, at 261.
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claims—those unifying Islamic themes (or, more accurately, perceptions of
those themes) take center stage.
Many Muslim immigrants over the past two decades, especially those
from the Middle East and South Asia, have come from and have retained
their religiously traditionalist cultures.131 African Americans, constituting
nearly one-third of American Muslims,132 are even more likely to hold to
conservative religious and moral precepts.133
Based on a 2007 survey by the Pew Research Center, a substantial
majority of American Muslims (61%) believed that society should
discourage homosexuality,134 although that number fell to less than half
(45%) in a 2011 survey.135 An earlier 2001 poll found that substantial
majorities of American Muslims opposed same-sex marriage (71%),
approved greater restrictions on abortion (57%), and supported stricter
regulation of pornography (65%).136 Majorities of Muslims also supported
prayer and display of the Ten Commandments in public schools.137 As with
Christians and Jews,138 more religiously active Muslims are even more
conservative in social and moral values.139
Muslim Americans also generally support a vigorous public role for
religiously grounded moral teachings, although they are more evenly
divided on the proper role of religious institutions in the political realm. As
the Pew Research Center reported in its 2007 survey, 59% of Muslim
Americans believed the government should play a stronger role in
protecting morality, while only 29% take the opposing position.140 Yet, by a
49% to 43% margin, Muslims believed their mosques should stay out of
politics.141 With respect to this divide, native-born Muslim-Americans, and

131. See Jalalzai, supra note 64, at 165.
132. Id. at 166.
133. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45 (“[N]ative-born African
American Muslims stand out for their particularly high levels of opposition to homosexuality
(75% say homosexuality should be discouraged).”).
134. Id. at 7.
135. 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 59.
136. Ali A. Mazrui, Muslims Between the Jewish Example and the Black Experience, in MUSLIMS’
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 117, 143 n.23 (citing American Muslim
Poll: November/December 2001, ZOGBY INT’L (Dec. 19, 2001), http://www.amp.ghazali.net/Zogby
_Poll_Dec_2001-000.htm).
137. Id.
138. ANDREW KOHUT ET AL., THE DIMINISHING DIVIDE: RELIGION’S CHANGING ROLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (2000); William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77
UMKC L. REV. 307, 308 (2008).
139. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45–46; 2011 PEW MUSLIM
AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 59–60.
140. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45–46.
141. Id. at 46.
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especially African-American Muslims, more strongly supported expression
on the political issues of the day by mosques.142
As Muslims become full-fledged participants in American democracy
while still retaining their Islamic identity, they will almost surely be another
voice for a healthy religious presence in the public square.143 As a matter of
both Islamic history and religious teaching, religion and government have
long been intertwined,144 as is historically true of other religions. As
Professor Faisal Kutty puts it, “Islam envisions no separation between the
temporal and the spiritual.”145 Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, President of the
Minaret of Freedom Institute, introduces what he acknowledges is a “novel,
and therefore controversial” argument in Muslim circles for the disestablishment of religion in sectors of public life.146 At the same time,
Ahmad emphasizes that “religion and politics cannot and should not be
completely separated,” arguing that “citizens in a democratic government
can and should bring their religious sensibilities to their positions on the
issues.”147
For Christians and Jews in the United States, a higher level of religious
engagement is likewise associated with more conservative or traditional views
on social and moral matters.148 But while religiously active Christians and
Jews are much more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party in national
politics,149 a substantial majority of American Muslims now identify
142. Id.
143. Professor Stephen Carter has defended the religious voice in the public square,
complaining that “we often ask our citizens to split their public and private selves, telling them
in effect that it is fine to be religious in private, but there is something askew when those private
beliefs become the basis for public action.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:
HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 8 (1993). As the late
Richard John Neuhaus wrote, “The alternative to the naked public square is not the sacred
public square; it is the civil public square.” Richard J. Neuhaus, Rebuilding the Civil Public Square,
44 LOY. L. REV. 119, 132 (1998).
144. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, American and Muslim Perspectives on Freedom of Religion, 8 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 355, 363 (2006) (stating that “the notion of entanglement of state and religion in
Muslim history” has been well “entrenched”); see also L. Ali Khan, The Qur’an and the
Constitution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (2010) (“[T]he Qur’an does establish a spiritual
normative order under which all systemic norms are subjected to God’s authority as embodied
in the Qur’an.”).
145. Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for
the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577 (2010).
146. Ahmad, supra note 144, at 364.
147. Id.
148. For more on the emergence of a devotional divide between Republicans and
Democrats, see generally Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1231–38.
149. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY:
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: DIVERSE AND POLITICALLY RELEVANT 19 (2008), available at
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (“Across a variety
of religious traditions, those who say that religion is very important in their lives, express a more
certain belief in God, or pray or attend worship services more frequently tend to be much more
conservative in their political outlook and more Republican in their party affiliation.”).
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themselves as Democrats, with only about 10% describing themselves as
Republicans.150
Because of widespread opposition by American Muslims to both the
foreign policy of the Bush Administration following September 11, 2001,
and the war in Iraq, as well as stronger support for government social
welfare programs, Muslims have shifted from supporting Republican
candidates to Democratic candidates in the last two presidential election
cycles.151
While most Americans tend to be conservative or liberal on both social
and governmental policies, Professor Farida Jalalzai cites the 2007 Pew
Research Center Report in concluding that Muslim Americans “are relatively
unique compared to the general population in their high degrees of
liberalism on social welfare while being very conservative on issues of
morality such as gay rights.”152 In fact, precisely because their perspectives on
various issues do not neatly fit the platforms of either party, and even while
majorities of Muslims have voted for Democratic presidential candidates, a
large proportion of Muslims resist affiliation with either political party.153
While devout Christians and Jews are more likely to affiliate with the
Republican Party,154 a focused survey finds that “Muslims who follow the
[Qur’an] and Hadith very much in their daily life are over 30% more likely
to select no political party as their partisan identification.”155
Despite this difference in political leanings, socially conservative
Muslims may encounter the same resistance from the liberal and secularist
side of the cultural divide as have conservative Christians and Jews. As
Professor Azizah al-Hibri writes, “a Muslim is committed to an integrated
worldview,” thus rejecting the “compartmentalization theory” which confines
religious faith to private life and excludes religiously based values from
public life.156 By contrast, “[t]he new sense of secularization is not neutral
among religions,” says al-Hibri, “but rather averse to them.”157 Writing
specifically about intellectual movements, Professor Sherman Jackson
predicts that Black Muslim Americans are especially likely “to promote a

150. 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 53 (reporting that 70% of U.S.
Muslims identify as Democrats, with only 11% as Republicans); 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS,
supra note 59, at 7 (reporting that 63% of U.S. Muslims identify as Democrats, with only 11% as
Republicans); 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 20 (reporting 49% of Muslim
Americans identify as Democrats, with only 8% as Republicans).
151. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 204–05.
152. Jalalzai, supra note 64, at 183.
153. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 220.
154. Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1233–36.
155. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 220.
156. al-Hibri, supra note 99, at 1134, 1136.
157. Id. at 1131.
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more critical stance . . . vis-à-vis the secularizing tendencies of Western
thought.”158
In sum, to borrow Professor Stephen Carter’s metaphor, like evangelical
Christians, traditional Catholics, and Orthodox Jews, religiously devout
Muslims refuse to treat their religion “as a hobby.”159 As with many other
religiously devout Americans, Muslims will instead conform their behavior to
their faith and allow their faith to inform their views on matters of public
concern.
c.

From 1996 to 2005: The Traditionalist Christian Disadvantage Disappears

In our prior study of decisions from 1986 to 1995, as we noted,
Catholics and Baptists were less successful than members of other religions
in raising religious free-exercise claims in federal court.160 We attributed this
result to a greater tendency by traditionalist Christian claimants to resist
application of various social welfare regulations and anti-discrimination laws to
church-related institutions.161 Catholic and Baptist objections to application of
employment discrimination laws against religious colleges, schools, and other
institutions; Catholic entities’ resistance to application of labor bargaining laws;
and Baptist challenges to safety and health regulation and other licensing of
religious schools were among the most common claims.162 During this period,
judges tended to view such regulatory measures and civil rights laws as serving
especially compelling public interests.163
Interestingly, however, the apparent difficulty in raising free-exercise
claims that we observed among Catholics and Baptists in the 1986–1995
study has faded away to statistical insignificance in the present 1996–2005
study.
In this present study, we added another Case Type variable for claims
asserting Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws, which accounted for 4.4%
of the claims in our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation data set. That new
variable proved statistically significant at nearly the p < .001 (or 99.9%
probability) level and in a positive direction. The substantive effect of the
Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws variable was also powerful. When all
other independent variables are held constant, the predicted probability
that a religious organization would succeed before an individual judge on an
exemption claim was 74.6%, while parties in other Religious Free

158. Sherman A. Jackson, Preliminary Reflections on Islam and Black Religion, in MUSLIMS’
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 201, 217.
159. See CARTER, supra note 143, at 29.
160. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 564.
161. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1045.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Exercise/Accommodation cases were likely to succeed at a rate of only
33.6%.164
Between 1996 and 2005, the federal courts of appeals affirmed—and
most extended—the longstanding “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws, while also broadly construing statutory exceptions for
religious employers.165 Grounded in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the ministerial exception precludes lawsuits challenging
a religious organization’s choice of employees who perform religious
functions, including the primary minister, priest, rabbi, or imam, and
increasingly other employees with religious worship or religious teaching
responsibilities.166
In Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, decided
in early 2012, the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutional foundation
of the ministerial exception, holding that it precluded an employment
discrimination suit against a religious school by a teacher who had the title
and responsibilities of a minister.167 Although the majority stated that the
“ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation”
and that a “rigid formula” should not be applied, the Court did not clearly
indicate the scope of the exception as applied to other employees of a
religious organization who are not formally commissioned as ministers.168
Accordingly, with the solidification and frequent expansion of the
ministerial exception in the lower federal courts between 1996 and 2005,
traditionalist religious organizations that were accused of discriminatory
employment practices were no longer at a disadvantage. For that reason
alone, perhaps, the poor prospects of traditionalist Christians that we
observed in our prior study have seemingly disappeared.
164. For further discussion of traditionalist Christians as claimants and the Exemption from
Anti-Discrimination Laws Case Type variable, see Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra
note 17, at 24–27.
165. Each of the following cases was included in our data set: Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Shaliehsabou v.
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care
Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213
F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Killinger v.
Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21
(2011) (“As it stands now, every federal circuit has adopted some form of the ministerial
exception, with the exception of the Federal Circuit (which has no jurisdiction over such
cases).”).
166. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the
Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 43, 48–49 (2008).
167. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705–10
(2012).
168. Id. at 707.
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No Evidence that the Muslim Disadvantage Is Due to Traditionalist Nature of
Islam

Might our finding that Muslims alone now suffer a meaningful
disadvantage in asserting Religious Free Exercise claims indicate that a
cultural antipathy to traditionalist religions has emerged in another context?
In terms of resistance to liberal secular social policy, have Muslims become
the new Catholics and Baptists? Given the nature of religious-liberty cases
involving Muslim claimants, we do not believe the evidence from our
present study can support that conclusion.
Although the claims by Muslims for recognition of their religious freeexercise rights do arise in a variety of contexts in our data set, including
challenges to regulations, assertion of free-expression rights, zoning
disputes, and employment discrimination, nearly three-quarters (74.7%) of
the observations involving Muslims in our data set are claims by prisoners.
Prisoner claims do not raise the kinds of challenges to secular social welfare
and anti-discrimination laws that present a direct conflict with traditional
moral teachings as did the claims of Baptists and Catholics that we examined
in our prior study. Non-prisoner claims by Muslims, of which the largest
share are employment discrimination cases against the federal government,
did not consistently involve the kinds of disputes that bring traditionalist
beliefs into conflict with government regulations or equality directives.
Indeed, in contrast with the continued frequency of claims by traditionalist
Christians for exemption from anti-discrimination laws, not a single one of
the Muslim claims in this study fell into that category.
In the final analysis, then, the so-called “Culture War” between religious
traditionalists and secular liberals did not connect with the types of religiousliberty claims being presented by Muslims to the federal courts in our study.
The traditionalist moral beliefs of Muslims may well clash with liberal
secularism and may impair their claims for religious liberty in other political
settings or judicial venues.169 Or perhaps Muslims will escape from being
recruited into one side or the other in the ongoing “Culture War.”
In any event, the great majority of Muslim claims in our study cannot be
categorized as conflicts between traditionalist values and secular public
policies. Whether or not Muslim integration into American society is
affected by general controversies over social and moral issues, our study
provides no evidence of any such effect in federal religious-liberty litigation.

169. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking
Foundations of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1779 (2011) (arguing that
religious liberty generally “is being slowly eroded by the forces of secularization and by the
decline of traditional religious understandings,” because the strong “religious-moral foundation
of religious liberty” has been undermined and the weaker “political-pragmatic justification for
religious liberty” may “lead to a far less generous regime of religious liberty and, eventually, the
complete demise of religious liberty as a distinctive constitutional or legal right”).
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3. The “Muslims Deserve To Lose” Thesis
Religious communities have contrasting doctrines, promote diverse
theological and moral values, have different expectations for their members,
and generate a variety of conflicts with government entities and rules.
Perhaps, one reasonably might inquire, Muslim claimants lose at a
disproportionate rate in the lower federal courts because their particular
claims of Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation are simply weaker or
different in nature than those presented by members of other religious
communities. In other words, one might postulate that to compare the
success of Muslim claimants to, say, Catholic or Native American claimants,
is to compare apples and oranges, such that disparities in outcome rates
have no substantive meaning and tell us nothing about judges or their
attitudes toward religious groups.
The ideal study of judicial decision-makers would examine the identical
case or specific question being simultaneously decided by a large set of
judicial actors. Such a natural experiment rarely presents itself in the real
world.170 Instead, nearly all empirical studies of courts and judges involve
large data sets of judicial rulings that encompass a multitude of different
cases, each of which presents circumstances, parties, arguments, and
dynamics that are to some extent unique to that case.
If that unavoidable starting point for empirical examination of judicial
decision-making disqualifies such studies, then nearly every attempt to
explore judicial behavior by quantitative measures simply dies aborning.
Some critics of the empirical study of judicial decision-making undoubtedly
would endorse that diagnosis of still-birth. We think the better response is to
do what is possible in planning and conducting an empirical study of judges
or courts to anticipate, measure, and control for meaningful differences
among the cases and decisions under study, while acknowledging the limits
and uncertainties inherent in such a study. Researchers then should conduct
follow-up and alternative studies to see if findings in one study are
confirmed or undermined by other studies.
Moreover, with respect to the merits of each case, the kinds of disputes
that are resolved by a written opinion by a federal judge typically involve
plausible claims and defenses by each side. Precisely in such circumstances,
statistical analysis of a larger set of decisions provides the opportunity to
search for patterns that might not be discernible in the individual case and
influences that may not be conscious to an individual decision-maker.

170. We have been fortunate in the past to study “such a natural laboratory, or something
quite close to it,” when “[t]he equivalent of a single case was presented to hundreds of federal
district court judges” who had to resolve constitutional challenges to the new federal sentencing
guidelines system in 1988. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1381 (1998). Such an opportunity, however, may come only once in a researcher’s lifetime.
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Uncovering such patterns by piercing through a fog of multiple factors and
variables is one of the great values of empirical research.
In the present study, several factors mitigate (but can never entirely
eliminate) the risk that we are comparing apples and oranges to no
productive end: First, as noted, our study examines only digested written
opinions by federal district and court of appeals judges. If the followers of a
specific religious tradition are prone to present frivolous claims, those
should be weeded out before reaching the stage where the judge has issued
a written ruling. For this reason, among the set of non-frivolous claims for
religious free exercise and accommodation that result in a written opinion,
if Muslims still fare worse than other claimants, as we have found in this
study, then something other than obvious lack of merit presumably explains
the result.171
Second, both this and our prior study of religious-liberty decisions
include a set of written decisions spanning a full decade. The effect of
episodic but short-lived trends in religious-liberty litigation and the type of
claims made should dissipate over the course of that time period. By
including a larger number of cases for analysis over a longer time sweep, the
idiosyncratic elements of any peculiar or atypical case should be submerged
into the greater mass of rulings and variables.
Third, to the extent that Muslim claimants tended to litigate as
individuals, while many other religious-liberty claims were brought by
institutions, we adjusted the model in the present study to separate out that
effect by adding a dummy “Institutional Religious Claimant” variable.
Churches, dioceses, parishes, synagogues, mosques, religious-affiliated
hospitals and universities, and other religious organizations were coded as
institutional claimants. In this way, we control in part for the perhaps greater
credibility and community standing of religious organizations, as well as
their presumably greater access to litigation resources, which also may result
in better framing of institutional claims through superior legal
representation.172
Religious groups represented in our study varied greatly on whether
claims were presented to the courts predominately by institutions or by
individuals. More than three-quarters (75.5%) of claims by Mainline
171. See Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 179, 186–87 (2010) (rejecting “The Simple Explanation” that the poor success rate for
Asian-American plaintiffs in racial harassment cases is because “Asian-American plaintiffs have
weak cases on the merits,” observing that the procedural and legal obstacles to bringing a case
to disposition in litigation likely means that “cases that reach this stage of litigation would be
strong rather than weak on the merits”).
172. Some legal scholars have called for a “more institution-sensitive understanding of the
Religion Clauses,” Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding
of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 291 (2008), and have asked whether “religious
entities occupy a distinctive place in our constitutional order,” Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The
Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002).
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Protestants and more than one-third (36.9%) of claims by Catholics were
brought by institutions, whereas the vast majority of claims by Muslims
(97.8%) and Native Americans (93.2%) were brought by individual
believers. In our primary model, the Religious Institutional Claimant
variable was significant and in the positive direction as hypothesized,
although the variable was not marginally significant in the secondary model
or the alternative models using party as a proxy for judicial ideology. Still,
given that we included the variable as a control to account in part for the
effects of organizational support and litigation resources, separate from the
religious identity of claimants, these results confirm the wisdom of adding
such a control variable to our model.
Finally, we included case-type control variables to ensure that any
relationship observed was not an artifact of a particular type of case. As
Professors Donald Songer and Susan Tabrizi explain, “integrated models will
be incompletely specified unless they include the particular case facts that
are most relevant for the type of cases examined.”173
Because 74.7% of the claims raised by Muslims in our data set arose in
the prison context, some will understandably wonder whether the litigation
disadvantage we discovered is attributable to this particular case type as a
proxy for merit-deficit. Some might be tempted to dismiss our study as
simply replicating in larger numbers the traditional inhospitality of the
courts to “a Muslims-in-prison case.”174
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, involving a prisoner claim under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Supreme Court noted that
Congress “anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard [for
evaluating burdens on religious practice] with ‘due deference to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.’”175
Thus, under one possible categorical approach to the often conflicting
themes in Supreme Court religious-liberty doctrine, prisoner claims may fit
into those “clusters of cases dealing with failed free exercise claims.”176
For several reasons, conjectures about the lack of merit to religiousliberty claims by prisoners in general, and by Muslims in particular, are

173. Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of
Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 511 (1999).
174. See Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism,
1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 261 (admonishing that “a long line of Supreme Court decisions
rejecting free exercise claims could each be satisfactorily explained to most Americans by simply
referencing the appropriate buzz words,” including “a Muslims-in-prison case” (citing O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987))).
175. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (quoting 146 CONG. REC. 16,698,
16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy)).
176. WITTE, supra note 87, at 146–47.
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belied by the empirical evidence. As we found in both this and our prior
study, prisoner claims in general are not less likely to succeed in court, at
least if those cases persevere to final written decisions. Moreover, the type of
claims typically raised by Muslim prisoners in our study—for prayer space or
dietary accommodation177—do not implicate special security or penological
concerns.
Most importantly, even controlling for the “prisoner effect”—the
supposition that claims by prisoners are likely to be perceived as less
meritorious—by removing all prisoner cases from the study, the Muslim
disadvantage remains significant in Religious Free Exercise/
Accommodation claims. In sum, prisoner cases are not driving the impaired
success of Muslim claimants in religious-liberty cases.
Given the unique setting of a prison, the special security concerns of
prison administrators and guards, the potentially dangerous nature of
prisoners, and the necessary loss of freedom that follows a criminal
conviction, one might understandably expect that judges would approach
prisoner claims with greater skepticism and thus that the success rate of
prisoners in requesting religious accommodations would be low. But despite
arguments for treating prisoner claims more skeptically and extending
greater deference to prison administration in regulating prison life, the
lower federal courts in written decisions do not appear to reject prisoner
claims at a higher rate than other types of religious-liberty claims.
In our prior 1986–1995 study, while 35.6% of Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claimants overall were favorably received by judges,
the success rate among prisoners on such claims was higher, at 40.2%—a
difference in outcome rate that was not statistically significant.178 Moreover, when
we conducted a focused regression analysis excluding all prisoner cases, the
results remained remarkably similar to those from the primary model.179
For the 1996–2005 study, the success rate of prisoners of all religious
affiliations (most of whom were not Muslims) asserting Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claims was 33.0%. When compared to the overall
success rate of 35.5% for claimants in all case types, the slightly lower success
rate for prisoner claims was, again, statistically insignificant.
In sum, in raising Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claims,
prisoners did not face greater resistance from the federal courts, at least in
our data set of cases resulting in a written decision. Indeed, in our current
study, the Prisoner case-type category control variable is statistically
significant (p < .01 or the 99% probability level) in a positive direction. Thus,
177. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON 23
(2008) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS PRISON REPORT], available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
STAT2008ERFIP.pdf (reporting that religious diet claims were 44.4% of religious grievances
filed administratively in federal prisons, while 55.5% involved access to religious programs).
178. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 561.
179. Id.
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our results do not suggest that, in general, prisoner claimants are
predetermined to fail—rather, we find that incarcerated Muslim claimants
are the true losers.
One might next query whether Muslims as a class of prisoners are
rightly treated differently, for reasons of substance rather than their mere
religious identity. Perhaps, some might suggest, the dominant Muslim sects
in prison culture may be more dangerous or preach violence and hatred,
thereby justifying tighter penal restrictions for legitimate security reasons.
Over the past decade, the nation has become increasingly aware that
extremist groups, from racial supremacists and right-wing anti-government
groups to radical environmentalists, have established a foothold within
prisons and seek to recruit prisoners to their various causes.180 Some fear
that radical Islamic groups tied to international terrorism have succeeded in
recruiting inmates to their extremist brand of Islam.181 Reports warn that
inmates leading worship, without supervision by trained Islamic chaplains,
“preach[] a breed of ‘Prison Islam’ that distorts Koranic teaching to
promote violence and gang loyalty.”182 Others, however, including the
leader of the prison chaplains’ organization, argue that “reports of prisons
being infiltrated by terrorists or terrorist organizations via prison religious
programs . . . have been blown way out of proportion.”183
While the presence of extremist sects of Islam in prison cannot be
denied, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice
reported in 2004 that 85% of Muslims in federal prison are Sunni or NOI184
and did not find that a substantial number of these are attracted to
Wahhabism (an extreme and exclusionary branch of Islam linked by some
to terrorism).185 Federal prison chaplains predicted that “strict Wahhabism
would not survive in prisons because it is too exclusionary to appeal to the

180. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DANGEROUS CONVICTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PRISONS 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_terr/
dangerous_convictions.pdf.
181. Waller Testimony, supra note 106.
182. Primary Sources: “Prison Islam,” ATLANTIC (Sept. 2004), http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2004/09/primary-sources/303427/.
183. Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2003) (testimony of Paul E. Rogers, President, American Correctional Chaplains
Association), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-search.cfm (select
hearing year “2003” and search witness testimony for “Rogers”; then follow “Mr. Paul Rogers”
hyperlink).
184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 5 (2004)
[hereinafter OIG REVIEW], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf.
185. See Stephen Seymour, Note, The Silence of Prayer: An Examination of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ Moratorium on the Hiring of Muslim Chaplains, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 523, 527–28
(2006).
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inmates.”186 A senior official from the Federal Bureau of Prisons “said that
he does not believe there is widespread terrorist radicalization or recruiting
occurring in [federal prisons].”187 A special report by the Homeland Security
Policy Institute at George Washington University and the Critical Incident
Analysis Group at the University of Virginia found that radicalization
“remains the exception among prisoners rather than the rule.”188
In sum, while we should take seriously the problem of prisoner
radicalization, we should be loath to paint the majority of Muslim inmates
with the brush of Islamic extremism.
In any event, before we could conclude that the Muslim prisoner
disadvantage in religious-liberty litigation is justified by weaker quality on the
merits, we would have to carefully examine the nature of claims actually
raised seeking Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation. We would need to
determine whether the claims as framed in court documents are infected by
extremism and whether the accommodations requested are excessive by
comparison. A Muslim prisoner with otherwise extreme religious views who
seeks basic worship opportunities or asks to avoid pork and receive meals
containing halal meat presumably ought not be treated any differently by a
court than a prisoner of moderate Islamic views or a Christian or Jew who
seeks a place to pray or a religiously mandated diet.
In our data set, the most common claims Muslim prisoners made were
simple requests, such as prayer space189 and dietary accommodations.190
186.
187.
188.

OIG REVIEW, supra note 184, at 9.
Id. at 7.
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST. & UNIV. OF VA. CRITICAL
INCIDENT ANALYSIS GRP., OUT OF THE SHADOWS: GETTING AHEAD OF PRISONER RADICALIZATION,
at iv, 14 (2006) [hereinafter PRISONER RADICALIZATION], available at www.gwumc.edu/hspi/
policy/PrisonerRadicalization.pdf.
189. See, e.g., Abdul-Matiyn v. Coughlin, 24 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Roth, 950
F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Counts v. Newhart, 951 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 116
F.3d 1473 (4th Cir. 1997).
190. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hill, 128 F. App’x 595 (9th Cir. 2005); McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 2003); Williams v.
Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Davis v. Clinton, 74 F. App’x 452 (6th Cir. 2003); Kind v.
Frank, 329 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2003); Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir.
1999); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); Eason v.
Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322 (5th Cir. 1996); Hudson v. Maloney, 326 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass.
2004); Brown v. Johnson, No. 98-CV-6260CJS(F), 2003 WL 360118 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2003);
Majid v. Wilhelm, 110 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Muhammad v. Warithu-Deen Umar, 98
F. Supp. 2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Denson v. Marshall, 59 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 1999),
aff’d, 230 F.3d 1347 (1st Cir. 2000); Abdullah v. Fard, 974 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Ohio 1997),
aff’d, 173 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 1999). While economic challenges in providing halal meats in
prison locations far from areas with large Muslim American populations could explain the
reluctance of prison authorities to make such accommodations, those logistical arguments were
rarely asserted in court. When those arguments were presented, however, administrative or
economic burdens proved surprisingly successful as defenses to religious-liberty claims by
prisoners in court, even when used to justify discriminatory treatment of Muslims compared to
others requesting a restricted-religious diet. See Williams, 343 F.3d at 217–22 (approving denial
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As Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy said in support of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act191: “It is well known
that prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known that prison
officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules.”192
Most importantly, the Muslim disadvantage in raising Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claims in federal court is not confined to the
prison setting (pun intended). Even when we excluded prisoner cases
altogether from the analysis and conducted a separate multivariate
regression analysis of all other case types, Muslims remained statistically
significant and negatively correlated with the outcome dependent variable—
with the significance of the Muslim variable increasing to the p < .01 or 99%
probability level.
In Figure 4, we present a comparison of predicted success rates for
Muslims as compared to non-Muslims in both Prisoner and Non-Prison
cases, holding all other explanatory variables constant.193 Muslims are
predicted to succeed before a federal judge at a rate of 15.5% in Prisoner
cases and 17.9% in Non-Prison cases.194 By contrast, non-Muslims are
predicted to succeed before a federal judge at a rate of 44.8% in a Prisoner
case and 37.3% in a Non-Prison case.195 Thus, a Muslim prisoner raising a
Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claim has only about a third the
chance for success as a non-Muslim prisoner, while Muslims raising claims

of halal meats to hundreds of Muslim prisoners based on security, administrative, and
budgetary burdens, while noting that there was no evidence that kosher meals in the prison
included meat); Fard, 974 F. Supp. at 1115 (denying halal meals to Muslim prisoners, despite
kosher meals being provided to Jewish prisoners because “[t]he number of inmates
demonstrating a need for such meals is small and [the prison] is able to meet the demand for
kosher food for those few inmates at reasonable cost from outside suppliers”).
191. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5
(2006).
192. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698, 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
193. In these case-type-differentiated regression analyses, a few claimant religion variables
were dropped from analysis because they lacked variation due to perfect prediction of failure
(Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Christian Variation in Prisoner cases; and Black
Separatists, Buddhists, and White Separatists in Non-Prison cases). In addition, the Case Type
control variables were necessarily omitted. Although the number of observations excluded in
each regression run was small (6 out of 569 observations lost in Prisoner cases and 19 out of
1062 observations lost in Non-Prison cases), the omission of these and the Case Type control
variables make these incompletely specified models. Accordingly, these predictions of effect size
are somewhat less reliable than the overall predictions presented in Figures 2 and 3 in Part
III.B.
194. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a Muslim claimant in a
Prisoner case ranges from 8.4% to 22.5%. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success
rate by a Muslim claimant in a Non-Prison case ranges from 7.5% to 28.4%.
195. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a non-Muslim claimant in a
Prisoner case ranges from 37.0% to 52.6%. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success
rate by a non-Muslim claimant in a Non-Prison case ranges from 34.0% to 40.7%.
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outside the prison setting succeed at a rate only about half that of nonMuslim religious-liberty claimants.
FIGURE 4
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY AND BY TYPE OF CASE
(PRISONER V. NON-PRISON)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Muslim
Claimant
(Prisoner)

Muslim
Claimant (NonPrison Case)

Non-Muslim
Claimant
(Prisoner)

Non-Muslim
Claimant (NonPrison Case)

In sum, Muslims still suffer a significantly and substantially diminished
success rate in federal court, even setting aside claims made by prisoners and
focusing instead on challenges to regulations, demands for protection of
religious expression, objections to zoning laws, allegations of employment
discrimination by the federal government as an employer, defenses to
criminal charges, and others.
4. The “Islam Viewed as Dangerous” Thesis: Perceptions and Realities
About American Muslims
The most obvious explanation for the Muslim disadvantage in asserting
claims in federal court for accommodation of Islamic religious beliefs is, in
our view, the one most likely to be correct. Beginning with the Islamic
revolution in Iran and terrorist episodes during the 1970s and 1980s, and
then accelerating through the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001,
Islam has been made “a target in the eyes of mainstream America.”196 As
Professor Richard Schragger writes, “[i]mmediately after 9/11, the idea that
Islam was a fundamentally violent and depraved religion that needed to be

196.

Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 212.
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opposed by right-thinking Americans took hold, and continues to be
asserted by relatively mainstream figures.”197
Pejorative news stories suggesting that Muslims in the West were
cultural invaders and sought to coercively impose “Sharia law”198 further
“fueled ‘moral panic.’”199 Sociologist Stanley Cohen, who originated the
term, defines “moral panic” as when a “condition, episode, person or group
of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and
interests [and] its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion.”200
The negative image of Islam and its followers in America, sadly accepted
by a substantial segment of our society, bears little resemblance to reality. As
reported by the Pew Research Center in 2007:
A comprehensive nationwide survey of Muslim Americans finds
them to be largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate
with respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and
Westerners around the world. Muslim Americans are a highly
diverse population, one largely comprised of immigrants.
Nonetheless, they are decidedly American in their outlook, values,
and attitudes. Overwhelmingly, they believe that hard work pays off
in this society. This belief is reflected in Muslim American income
and education levels, which generally mirror those of the general
public.201
Muslims have entered into mainstream America, energetically participating
in the marketplace and social life. Based on a comprehensive survey of
mosque leaders, Professor Ihsan Bagby reports the “virtually unanimous view
(96 percent)” among mosque leaders that Muslims should be “involved in

197. Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: SameSex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009, 2011–12
(2011).
198. See Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First Amendment,
5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 347–50 (2011) (describing 2010 ballot initiative in Oklahoma to
ban the use of “Sharia law” in court, to oppose the supposed intent of Muslims to bring all of
Americans under Sharia law, as a campaign “to translate [private] animus into official form”);
Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 967–69, 971–73,
977–78 (2011) (stating that “Muslims are also on the receiving end of a great deal of cultural
antipathy,” providing numerous examples, including the anti-Sharia law movement).
199. Kutty, supra note 145, at 566–67 (discussing how a proposal in Ontario, Canada for
Muslims to use arbitration laws to voluntarily resolve family disputes by religious principles was
misrepresented in the media as an effort to establish “new ‘Shari’a Courts’ with coercive powers
to force all Muslims to arbitrate using Islamic laws”).
200. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9 (1980).
201. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 1.

A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

MUSLIMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

10/10/2012 12:13 PM

279

American society—they do not envision a community isolated from the
American society.”202
A larger percentage of Muslims (71% in 2007, 74% in 2011) than the
general American public (64% in 2007, 62% in 2011) has adopted the
strong work ethic that is iconic of the “American way”—believing people can
move ahead through hard work and determination.203 Evidencing their
educational success, 86% of American Muslims, both men and women, work
in three fields: engineering and electronics, computer science and data
processing, and medicine.204
Muslim American women are especially highly educated when
compared with other faiths, second only to Jewish women, and Muslim
Americans have the highest level of gender pay equity.205 About half of
Muslim Americans report having close friends from outside the Islamic
faith.206 Overall, more than three-quarters of Muslims in the United States
report that they are happy or satisfied with their lives.207 A very recent poll
found that, among all religious groups, Muslim Americans are the most
optimistic about their future.208
Attributable in part to their greater social and economic integration—
having achieved income and education levels comparable to those of other
Americans, unlike the persistent poverty and unemployment experienced by
Muslim immigrants in Europe209—American Muslims are much more likely
than their European counterparts to repudiate Islamic extremism.210 Only
5% have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, and only 1% believes that suicide
bombings are often justifiable to defend Islam, with only 7% saying they are
sometimes justifiable.211 To be sure, even a small radical minority is cause for
concern and appropriate vigilance. But that is true of other demographic
groups in American society as well. We must remember that the most
horrific home-grown terrorist attack on the United States was the Oklahoma

202. Ihsan Bagby, The Mosque and the American Public Square, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 323, 325.
203. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 2, 30; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS,
supra note 103, at 40.
204. Ba-Yunus & Kone, supra note 102, at 317–18.
205. 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 11, 56–57.
206. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 2; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS,
supra note 103, at 35.
207. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 29; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS,
supra note 103, at 37.
208. ABU DHABI GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE 13
(2011) [hereinafter GALLUP MUSLIMS FUTURE], available at http://www.gallup.com/
strategicconsulting/153611/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-Faith-Freedom-Future.aspx.
209. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 3, 18–19.
210. See id. at 53–55.
211. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 5, 53–54; 2011 PEW MUSLIM
AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 65–66.
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City bombing in 1995—perpetrated by a white supremacist.212 Indeed, the
most recent Gallup poll found that, among all major religious groups in
America, Muslims are least likely to believe that an attack on civilians could
ever be justified.213
Followers of Islam support a stronger role for religious, or at least
religiously based, moral teachings in public life (59%),214 in which they
differ not at all from evangelical Christians and conservative Catholics and
Jews, as well as 37% of the American general public.215 Indeed, a higher
percentage of Christians (54%) than Muslims (43%) think religious
institutions should express political views.216
Just under half of American Muslims say they think of themselves as
Muslim first and American second, but a similar proportion of Christians
identify themselves primarily as Christian before American.217 Indeed, a
devout religious believer will likely regard the precepts of God and the unity
of God’s children as having a greater call on the believer than the
ordinances of man and the structures of nationality.218 Christian civil rights
leader Martin Luther King, Jr. famously wrote in his Letter from Birmingham
City Jail in 1963 that “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws”
that do not square with “the law of God.”219 Former British Lord Chancellor
Thomas More, who was executed by King Henry VIII in 1535 for refusing to
take an oath to the King’s supremacy over the church, perished as “the
King’s good servant, but God’s first.”220 (More was pronounced the patron
saint of politicians and lawyers by Pope John Paul II in 2000.)221 Thus, giving
priority of place to one’s faith and religious identity, over ethnic and
212. See Lois Romano & Tom Kenworthy, McVeigh Guilty on All 11 Counts, WASH. POST (June
3, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/stories/
guilty2.htm (describing Timothy McVeigh’s conviction and adoption of a white supremacist
novel calling for the violent overthrow of the government as his “political bible”). On the
McVeigh case generally, see United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998)
(affirming conviction and death sentence for Timothy McVeigh in 1995 bombing of Oklahoma
City federal building).
213. GALLUP MUSLIMS FUTURE, supra note 208, at 6, 31.
214. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 7.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 8.
217. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 31; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS,
supra note 103, at 34.
218. See Omar Khalidi, Living as a Muslim in a Pluralistic Society and State: Theory and
Experience, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 38, 65
(encouraging Muslim parents to “[i]nculcat[e] the idea that Islam is beyond time, space, and
ethnic and national identities”).
219. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), in THE AMERICAN
READER 568, 571 (Diane Ravitch ed., 2d ed. 2000).
220. PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 394 (1998) (last words before his
execution (July 6, 1535)).
221. GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 866
(Harper Perennial ed. 2005).
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national allegiances, has a long and honored tradition in Anglo-American
history.
Unfortunately, as every scholar, and especially every empirical
researcher, recognizes, popular public perceptions do not always coincide
with the reality confirmed by evidence beyond the anecdotal. In 2010, the
Pew Research Center found that more Americans harbored an unfavorable
view (38%) of Islam than a favorable one (30%).222 In 2009, a Gallup poll
found a majority of Americans had either a “not too favorable” or “not
favorable at all” attitude toward Islam.223 In 2010, the margin between
Americans who reject and those who accept the proposition that Islam is
more likely than other religions to encourage violence was only 7% (42%
reject to 35% accept).224 By the following year, the margin had slipped to
only two percent (42%–40%).225 In 2004, Cornell University’s Media and
Society Research Group reported that 44% of Americans believed that, to
protect against terrorism, the government should “curtail civil liberties for
Muslim Americans” in the United States.226 Professor Aminah Beverly
McCloud worries that the tragic events of 9/11 have “hardened further the
hearts of those who see Islam and Muslims as a threat to the ‘freedoms,
rights, and peacefulness’ of the United States.”227
The remaining question and the subject of the next Part of this Article
is whether the persistent uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its
followers has filtered into the attitudes of federal judges and affected rulings
on religious-liberty claims. If so, as we suggest below, then the country faces
a new threat to religious liberty.
V. OF TIDES AND CURRENTS: FEDERAL JUDGES AND ATTITUDES ABOUT ISLAM
IN AMERICA
When adherents to Islam turn from ineffective or unraveling
accommodations in the political realm and assert constitutional or parallel
statutory claims for the free exercise of their religion, the courts responding
to those claims are, of course, populated by human beings. The men and
women who preside over those cases are as human as the rest of us, hardly
immune from “[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
222. Public Remains Conflicted over Islam, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2010), http://
pewresearch.org/pubs/1706/poll-americans-views-of-muslims-object-to-new-york-islamic-centerislam-violence.
223. THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS IN AMERICA: WITH AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS OF U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD MUSLIMS AND ISLAM 4, 7 (2009), available at
http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153434/ENGLISH-First-PDF-Test.aspx.
224. Public Remains Conflicted over Islam, supra note 222.
225. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 109, at 1.
226. Fear Factor: 44 Percent of Americans Queried in Cornell National Poll Favor Curtailing Some
Liberties for Muslim Americans, CORNELL NEWS (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.news.cornell.edu/
releases/Dec04/Muslim.Poll.bpf.html.
227. McCloud, supra note 62, at 83.
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men.”228 The horrific events of September 11, 2001, the strong emotional
responses of a shattered nation, and the subsequent social and political
convulsions, have not passed by the judges, notwithstanding their place in
the elite sectors of society and their independence from ordinary political
processes and economic dislocations. Every American from every walk of life
was profoundly affected by the 9/11 attacks on our nation, which took the
lives of Americans from every walk of life, not discriminating by socioeconomic status, ideology, race, color, or religion.
Judges at the higher ranks of the federal judiciary, observe Professors
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, “care more about the views of academics,
journalists, and other elites than they do about public opinion.”229 The elite
audiences for federal judges may be liberal on civil liberties,230 and the social
circles in which federal judges move generally consist of highly educated
and wealthy people.231 But judges are not hermetically sealed away from the
fears and fear-generated stereotypes that infect the general public. And
when those fears are provoked by terrorist attacks that were deliberately
targeted at prominent places regularly visited by the elites—the centers of
commerce and government—then the walls may come down.
Well before 9/11, and with increasing frequency afterward, one need
have only picked up a newspaper, turned on the television, or listened with
half-an-ear to informal conversations at a coffee shop or while waiting at the
airport to have heard admissions of disquiet about our Muslim neighbors or
negative characterizations about Islam. While most federal judges
undoubtedly would be among the plurality of Americans answering “no” to
such polling questions as whether Islam encourages violence more than
other religions,232 judges still hear those questions being insistently asked.
And if we hear alarming assertions repeated regularly, we may internalize
those concepts, leaving us uneasy at a subconscious level. Stereotypes about
Muslims may have been so powerful as to override the social psychology
patterns and judicial role attitudes that otherwise would move federal judges
toward greater tolerance.
The results of our ongoing study suggest that an uneasiness about
Muslims in America and disquiet about Islam had filtered into the federal
judiciary well before 2001, extending back more than a decade before
Islamic extremist violence erupted on American soil. While 9/11 may not

228. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 168.
229. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American
People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (writing about Supreme Court Justices); see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 25
(2006) (saying, as a matter of social psychology theory, that “[p]eople want to be liked and
respected by others who are important to them”).
230. Baum & Devins, supra note 229, at 1545.
231. BAUM, supra note 229, at 89–90.
232. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text.
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have initially implanted such attitudes, the attacks on our nation have
undoubtedly made it harder to remove them, even for people committed to
equity. Given the strong role that emotion plays in our psychology and
cognition,233 the national concussion that we collectively suffered from
witnessing the events of September 11, 2001, has surely left psychological
scars and cognitive impairments with us all, even if we are not always aware
of them.234 That deeply emotional national experience undoubtedly has
infused “implicit beliefs” that affect the way in which we understand the
world around us.235 Borrowing concepts from social and cognitive
psychology, we may be able to better explain the Muslim disadvantage in
religious-liberty cases and further understand the cognitive load on the
judges who decide their fate.
In the types of cases that we examine in the present study, the religious
claimant invariably is challenging government decisions, which in turn are
often defended by public officers as necessary to law and order. Thus, we
believe, even more so than in other types of litigation, underlying negative
impressions about Muslims or Islam are likely to emerge, even if not
consciously realized by the decider. Indeed, a Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation claim, by its nature, highlights the claimant’s
religious beliefs and practices. Thus, when a religious-liberty claim is
presented to a federal judge by a follower of Islam, his or her Muslim
identity is placed front and center, not merely being a secondary attribute of
the litigant. Stereotypes about Muslims as security risks and Islam as a
religion of violence are especially likely to be activated in contexts that
already breed negative stereotypes, such as claims by prisoners—the lion’s
share of claims by Muslims included in this study.236
As psychology Professor Seymour Epstein explains, each of us
“apprehend[s] reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously
labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and experiential,

233. See Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory of Personality, in 5 HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 159, 160–61 (Theodore Millon, Melvin J.
Lerner & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (describing “the experiential conceptual system”—the
unconscious side of cognition—as “emotionally driven”).
234. See id. at 160 (explaining that the experiential or unconscious system of cognition in
human beings “adapts by learning from experience rather than by logical inference,” including
encoding information “particularly [from] events that were experienced as highly emotionally
arousing”).
235. See Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 715 (1994) (explaining that “[p]eople have constructs about the self
and the world” in the “two major systems by which people adapt to the world,” with constructs
in the rational system being “beliefs” and constructs in the experiential system being “implicit
beliefs” or “schemata,” which “consist primarily of generalizations derived from emotionally
significant past experience”).
236. See supra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.
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and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational.”237 Not only is the
unconscious, intuitive, or experiential system an elemental part of our
personality, but we could not function if we had to deliberately and
purposefully pass every inclination and choice of action across the
conscious, rational side. Psychology Professor and Nobel Laureate in
economics Daniel Kahneman describes “System 1” (our intuitive process) as
“operat[ing] automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense
of voluntary control,” while “System 2” (our “conscious reasoning self”) gives
“attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it.”238 As Kahneman
puts it, “the division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly
efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes performance.”239
Despite being an integral and often beneficial side of our personality,
Epstein warns that the experiential system is “[m]ore crudely differentiated”
and lends itself to “stereotypical thinking.”240 When we are making decisions
about particular people, fundamental fairness and respect for human
dignity demand that we make individual and rational judgments.241 Because
“[i]mplicit biases function automatically,” observes a group of law and
psychology scholars in a recent article with Professor Jerry Kang as lead
author, we must seek to counter harmful subconscious prejudices by
“engag[ing] in effortful, deliberative processing.”242
We would be foolish and unjust to indict judges for being human and
thus having an intuitive or experiential side to their personalities. If we have
correctly diagnosed an unconscious tendency among federal judges to
respond negatively to Muslim requests for exemption or accommodation
from government rules or policies, then we really have done nothing more
than identify one more dimension of that general attitude among the
American people. In sum, it is not a problem with judges, but a problem
with (nearly) all Americans.
Nonetheless, we properly demand that judges strive for impartiality,
thus becoming aware of and overcoming stereotypes and biased inferences

237. Epstein, supra note 235, at 710; see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003) (“The present
treatment distinguishes two modes of thinking and deciding, which correspond roughly to the
everyday concepts of reasoning and intuition.”). On dual-process theories of cognition as
applied to judging, see generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
238. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (adopting terms
originally proposed by psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West).
239. Id. at 25.
240. Epstein, supra note 235, at 711 tbl.1.
241. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2002) (“If our values include fairness and treating people as
individuals, then anything that increases self-awareness should decrease our application of
stereotypes.”).
242. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1177 (2012).
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that could be affecting their decision-making ability at an unconscious level.
Psychology Professor Albert Bandura emphasizes that “[t]he capability to
reflect upon oneself and the adequacy of one’s thoughts and actions is . . .
[an] exclusively human attribute . . . .”243 Professor Gary Blasi writes:
A general awareness of our frail rationality, however, is not
sufficient. In order to inhibit judgments and behavior based on
stereotypes, we must be aware of the specific stereotype at the time it
is activated. The entire thrust of the research . . . is that stereotype
activation often takes place at a preconscious or subconscious level.
Assuming we do have some specific and timely awareness, we must
also have both the motivation and the ability to control stereotype
activation and application. Motivation can be supplied by social
norms or our own moral values and personal will. The ability to
control these otherwise automatic processes means devoting time
and cognitive resources to focusing on individuating
information.244
Many judges have no doubt conducted such careful self-examinations
and emphasized conscious cognition in deliberations about religious-liberty
cases involving Muslims (and other claimants). Not only does a particular
ruling against a Muslim claimant standing alone fail to show bias, conscious
or unconscious, but Muslims did not fail on every religious-liberty claim in
our study (even though Muslims collectively did fail at a disproportionate
rate). We take this opportunity to remind our readers that “it is not proper
to assume that a social scientific finding is a good description of all
individuals studied, much less any particular individual within a study.”245
Nonetheless, despite our own enormous respect for judges, more than
one of whom we count as friends, we have no reason to believe that judges as
a group are exempt from the implicit biases held by the general population.
For example, an important study by Professors Jeffrey Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Chris Guthrie, and Judge Andrew Wistrich produced results that
were “both alarming and heartening: (1) Judges hold implicit racial biases.
(2) These biases can influence their judgment. (3) Judges can, at least in

243. Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Personality, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY
154, 180 (Lawrence A. Pervin & Oliver P. John eds., 2d ed. 1999).
244. Blasi, supra note 241, at 1252–53; see also Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic
Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 247 (2002) (insisting that
“highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic operation of stereotypes and
prejudice”); Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 346 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds.,
1999) (“First, one must be aware of the potential influence of the stereotype. This condition is
rather obvious; one cannot counteract the outcome if one is unaware of the need for
counteraction.”).
245. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1735 n.58 (2008).
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some instances, compensate for their implicit biases.”246 Judicial role
expectations and a “professional commitment” to racial equality
“appear[ed] to have limited impact on automatic racial associations” among
the judges they studied.247 Encouragingly, the researchers found, “when
judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence
of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear
able to do so.”248 Along the same lines, we hope our study imparts the need
for judges to monitor and suppress the influence of negative religious
stereotypes as well.
To avoid stereotypic responses, psychology Professors Patricia Devine
and Margo Monteith maintain that a decision-maker must “tak[e] the more
effortful and time-consuming route of gathering individual pieces of
information about the target, rather than relying on activated
stereotypes.”249 With a “bottom-up model” of judging, instead of resolving a
dispute by abstract theoretical reasoning that is vulnerable to the influence
of unconscious attitudes, the judge constructs a decision by assembling the
facts and evidence that make up the building blocks of an individual case.250
Fortunately, in 2006—just after the period examined in the present
study—the Supreme Court clarified religious free-exercise doctrine251 in a
manner that may motivate federal judges to engage in the kind of “cognitive
correction”252 that could mitigate the biasing influences of the unconscious
mind.
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal,253 the Supreme
Court unanimously insisted that RFRA254 demands a “focused” and not a
“categorical approach” when balancing the government’s interest against
the burden on the claimant’s ability to freely exercise their religion.255 The
Court pronounced “that the compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant

246. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009).
247. Id. at 1222.
248. Id. at 1221.
249. Devine & Monteith, supra note 244, at 347; see Kang et al., supra note 242, at 1160
(warning that when judges “lack sufficient individuating information,” they “have no choice but
to rely more heavily on [their] schemas”).
250. See Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Judicial Reasoning, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 41, 48 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010)
(“The bottom-up model is a data-driven reasoning process whereby the evidence, information,
facts, and legal considerations objectively guide the decision maker.”).
251. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
252. See Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie, supra note 246, at 1223 (noting that,
when motivated, judges appeared to take steps to compensate for unconscious racial biases).
253. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418.
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006).
255. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430.
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whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”256
Accordingly, with respect to a religious sect that makes sacramental use of a
hallucinogenic substance, the government’s “mere invocation” of a general
prohibition on non-medical use of narcotics without individualized casespecific scrutiny was not insufficient.257
Reexamining this decision from a social-psychology perspective, O
Centro mandates that judges hearing religious-liberty claims move beyond
“category-based processes” and instead devote concerted attention to
“individuating processes” that focus on the claimant’s particular attributes,
thereby loosening the grip of stereotypes258: First, if the government no
longer may rest on unexamined generalized policy concerns in defending
religious-liberty cases—such as health and safety, national security, law and
order, equality, the war on drugs, or uniform application—then the
government is less likely to rely on crude categories that implicate
stereotypes. In any event, because the court must now “look[] beyond
broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of
government mandates,”259 the deciding judge is encouraged to abandon
stereotypical generalizations and engage in a differentiated and
individualized analysis of each claim.
Second, by requiring that a court treat each religious-liberty claimant as
an individual and conduct a focused examination, the O Centro Court
effectively directs the deciding judge to resist intuitive or stereotypical
responses to a claimant or claim. In this way, the court instead may better
appreciate the character of the claimant’s religious practice and the nature
of the requested accommodation. By undertaking that examination, the
judge should learn about each claimant’s faith perspective, objectively and

256. Id. at 430–31; see also Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222 (1994) (“It is not enough that the
government’s regulation or program as a whole serves a compelling interest. Rather, the
‘application of the burden to the person’ must be the ‘least restrictive means’ of furthering a
compelling interest.”); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards, 66
U. MIAMI L. REV. 923, 928 (2012) (arguing that, under current religious-liberty doctrine,
prison grooming policies cannot be sustained without “a particularized evidentiary basis that
the specific plaintiffs or inmates in question pose an actual or threatened risk to the state’s
compelling penological interests”).
257. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 432.
258. See Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and
Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (Mark P. Zanna ed.,
1990) (explaining that people first use category-based processes to form impressions of
another, but turn to attribute-oriented processes given the opportunity and motivation). But see
Laurie A. Rudman, Peter Glick & Julie E. Phelan, From the Laboratory to the Bench: Gender
Stereotyping Research in the Courtroom, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 83, 85–90 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) (arguing that use of
individuating information to contradict stereotypes is difficult and complex).
259. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431.
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rigorously but also sympathetically, thereby substituting new information
and understanding for implicit beliefs.
Because the experiential system of our personality is so resilient, a
decision-maker’s considered and sincere resolution to set aside intuitions
and stereotypes may fall short.260 A person may be better advised to “improve
[the experiential system] by providing it with corrective experiences.”261 As
psychology researcher Seymour Epstein further suggests, because “the
experiential system learns directly from experience, another procedure is to
provide real-life corrective experiences [or] to utilize imagery, fantasy, and
narratives for providing corrective experiences vicariously.”262 Professor
Kang and associates refer to this “potentially effective strategy” to reduce the
impact of implicit biases in the courtroom as “expos[ing] ourselves to
countertypical associations.”263
By regular exposure to the diversity of the community, including
different religious communities, judges may gain “real-life corrective
experiences” to counter any unfortunate prejudices they may harbor against
Islam or any other religious tradition. Within the courtroom, while the judge
of course must eschew “imagery” or “fantasy” (which Epstein suggests for
therapeutic purposes only), the judge should explore the claimant’s religion
through evidentiary narrative, allowing the judge to gain an appreciation for
the faith tradition on its own terms, rather than as filtered through the lens
of media and other portrayals.
Faithful application of the Supreme Court’s O Centro framework may be
a step forward in suppressing religious stereotypes and ensuring fair
evaluation of each religious-liberty claim. By demanding individuated
analysis, while resisting categorical generalizations, the O Centro decision
may advance more equitable and properly differentiated treatment of each
religious claimant, Muslim or otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly alone among the diverse groups of religious claimants included
in our study of Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claims in the lower
federal courts from 1996 to 2005, Muslims were significantly and powerfully
associated with a negative outcome. By comparison, claimants from other
religious communities were nearly twice as likely to prevail as Muslims, even
after controlling for other possible influences. Our findings were stronger
and revealed the greatest disparities when examining rulings by the judges
of the federal courts of appeals.
260. Epstein, supra note 233, at 166 (“[G]iven the intrinsically compelling nature of
experiential processing and its highly adaptive value in most situations in everyday life, such
resilience is to be expected.”).
261. Id. at 161.
262. Id. at 165.
263. Kang et al., supra note 242, at 1169.
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“Islam,” says Professor Richard Schragger, “is testing the polity’s
commitment to religious tolerance.”264 We would add that it also appears to
be testing the judiciary’s commitment to the impartial adjudication of claims
of religious liberty among the diverse faith communities that bring
constitutional and statutory religious-liberty claims in the federal courts.
Schragger further observes that, while the reaction to the terrorist attacks of
9/11 has not yet been translated into the law, “it is just a matter of time
before the politics of 9/11 comes to the doctrinal fore in the Religion
Clauses.”265 Based on our study, public uneasiness with Muslims has long
been felt concretely in the actual outcomes of religious-liberty cases, if not
yet expressly articulated in the doctrine.
Each generation of Americans is called upon to renew the promise of
religious liberty in the face of new political and cultural threats. More than a
half century ago, the public demand for fealty to America in the face of
external and internal threats of totalitarian ideologies imposed itself on
religious communities who refused to engage in certain public displays of
loyalty. Although initially sacrificing religious conscience to nationalism, the
Supreme Court reversed course and eventually upheld the right of the
children of Jehovah’s Witnesses not to salute the flag in public schools.266
During the 1970s and 1980s, the War on Drugs was extended to
interrupt ceremonial use of sacred substances, when the Supreme Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit enforcement of Oregon
drug laws against sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans.267 Once
again, a course correction came with the intervention of Congress in
enacting RFRA268 generally, and then specifically extending permission for
ceremonial use of peyote to all members of recognized Indian tribes.269
Subsequently, based on RFRA, the Supreme Court held unanimously that,
when a religious sect makes sacramental use of a hallucinogenic substance,
“mere invocation” by the government of a general prohibition on nonmedical use of narcotics is insufficient to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest to override the individual’s sincere exercise of
religion.270
More recently, the movement for equality has led to an expansion of
anti-discrimination laws to cover new categories of protected persons, to
include new sectors of society (employment, education, housing, services), and
to apply to new entities, sometimes including religiously affiliated associations.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
(2006).

Schragger, supra note 197, at 2010.
Id. at 2014.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006).
Id. § 1996a(b)(1).
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432
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When, for example, traditionalist religious associations seek exemption from
laws that require provision of birth control coverage to all employees271 or
that preclude discrimination in employment and services on the basis of
sexual orientation,272 these religious groups run hard against the grain of
mainstream secular society in certain regions of the country or
municipalities.273 Although the extended application of the constitutional
ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws appears to have somewhat
ameliorated the impact on religious communities,274 this cultural conflict
between liberal secularists and laws and traditionalist religious groups and
persons may emerge again in religious-liberty jurisprudence.
And now, we find that the post-9/11 backlash against Muslims and
longstanding societal antipathy toward or fear of Islam poses a growing
threat to religious liberty in the United States. Professor Noah Feldman
likens the anti-Muslim bias that has erupted over the past couple of years to
the animosity directed at Jehovah’s Witnesses in the 1940s.275 Once again,
we find the religious consciences of a people of faith being sacrificed to
shifting political and cultural forces. American history teaches us that the
free exercise of religion may too easily be submerged beneath platitudes
about “law and order,” “national security,” or “the equal opportunity

271. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004)
(denying religious exemption to Catholic Charities from state statute requiring employers to
provide contraceptive coverage to employees). See generally Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise
Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 101 (2006) (arguing that “society benefits from the
existence and checking function of independent sources of moral authority” and, for that
reason, “we should protect [Catholic Charities’] ability to be faithful to that vision against state
regulations that undermine its moral integrity—unless some sufficiently important state interest
is at stake that cannot be adequately furthered through some other means”); Susan J. Stabile,
When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: Catholic Institutions, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137,
150 (2007) (“A religious institution cannot communicate an effective message that conduct is
sinful at the same time that it pays for that conduct to occur.” (quoting Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 14, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) (No.
03-1618), 2004 WL 1243136, at *14)).
272. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 206 (2010) (“Catholic Charities of Boston, a large provider of social
services in Massachusetts, was told it would be barred from performing adoptions in the state
unless it agreed to place children in same-sex households.”); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2011) (suggesting that a
major current threat to religious liberty flows from perceptions by the gay rights movement that
“traditional religion [is] their principal enemy” and further criticizing the failure of both gay
rights activists and religious traditionalists to find compromise); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 302 (2010)
(referring to “the now-famous withdrawal of adoption services by Catholic Charities of Boston, a
case that sadly illustrates the social costs that may be incurred when religious charities are faced
with nondiscrimination requirements in tension with faith principles” (footnote omitted)).
273. See Sisk, supra note 17, at 1049–50.
274. See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
275. Noah Feldman, Islamic Constitutionalism in Context: A Typology and a Warning, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 436, 437–38 (2010).
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society.” Subordination of religious conscience to the dictates of the state,
the preferences of the mainstream culture, or the stereotypes fostered by
fear, in the name of some policy goal, societal convenience, or comfort to
the fearful, is the antithesis of religious liberty.
We are all living in the shadow of 9/11—but that shadow appears to be
longer and darker for Muslim Americans. By shining the light on the costs to
religious liberty, we hope that shadow may begin to dissipate.

